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1	STATE OF CONNECTICUT
2	STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION
3	PURCHASE OF SERVICE AND RELATED MATTERS
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	DATE: July 24, 2025
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	LOCATION: VIA ZOOM
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7	Present:
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	Peter Adomeit, Chairman
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	Michael Carey, Trustee
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	Carl Chisem, Trustee
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	John Disette, Trustee
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	David Krayeski, Trustee
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	Robert Helfand, Retirement Services Division
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	Benjamin Sedrowski, Retirement Services Division
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	Cindy Cieslak, Rose Kallor, LLP
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1	PROCEEDINGS.
2	(Meeting called to order at 9:34 a.m.)
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4	CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. This is a Purchasing
5	Subcommittee, Retirement Commission, held remotely
6	using Zoom technology. And Cindy, do you have the
7	attendance, please?
8	ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Good morning. This is Cindy
9	Cieslak. Present today we have Chairman Peter
10	Adomeit, Trustee Michael Carey, Trustee Carl Chisem,
11	Trustee David Krayeske.
12	From the Retirement Services Division, Robert
13	Helfand and Ben Sedrowski, and then Cindy Cieslak,
14	General Counsel from Rose Kallor.
15	CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: John Herrington will not be
16	joining.
17	Okay, interesting. I don't have the agenda.
18	I'm sorry.
19	MR. SEDROWSKI: I'll forward the package right
20	back to you.
21	CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: One more time, sir.
22	ATTORNEY CIESLAK: I also have it. Oh, John
23	Disette, Trustee, is joining us right now.
24	CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right.
25	ATTORNEY CIESLAK: And Mr. Chairman, I do

1 believe when Ben emailed us, he said one of the 2 items needed to be removed from the agenda. 3 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. 4 MR. SEDROWSKI: Yes, that would be correct. 5 Faleisha Johnson. 6 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: I don't have the agenda. 7 I'm sorry. 8 MR. SEDROWSKI: Mr. Chairman, I did just re-9 forward the package to you, so it should be coming 10 into your email momentarily. 11 MR. CAREY: So, this is Mike Carey. Ben, if we 12 need to amend the agenda to remove the Johnson 13 matter, I would make the motion that we amend the 14 agenda accordingly to remove the Johnson matter from 15 today's discussion. 16 MR. KRAYESKE: I can second that. Krayeske. 17 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah, I have to -- I have to 18 find the agenda. Did someone mail it to me? 19 ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Yes, Ben mailed it to you. 20 And then I can also put a link in the chat. 21 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Let me see what the mail 22 Just a second. So, has the agenda being sent says. 23 I apologize. to me? 24 ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Yes. So, Ben emailed it 25 like two days ago, and then I think he just

forwarded it again to you. And then, if you go to the chat, I did put the link to it in the chat box. So, you can just click on the link and it should pop up on your screen.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The chat box, okay. Is that in the chat box right there? Yeah. Yeah. Okay.

All right. I thank you very much.

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Mr. Chairman, Trustee Carey moved, and Trustee Krayeske seconded to remove the Johnson matter from the agenda. So we are ready to call that motion.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. All in favor, say aye or raise your hand. Opposed nay or raise your hand. It's unanimous, the ayes have it.

All right, we have -- do we have motion to approve the agenda? Have we done that? Okay, thank you.

MR. CAREY: Mr. Chairman, this is Mike Carey.

I move that we approve the agenda as amended by the prior vote.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay.

MR. CHISEM: Carl Chisem, second.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All in favor say aye or raise your hand. It's unanimous, the ayes have it.

All right, new business. What's the item that

we're not covering?

MR. CAREY: It's the Johnson matter. Letter C, the third of the five.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you. All right, so let's do Lynn Kajda.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Okay, everyone. Ms. Kajda is at page two of your packet. She has submitted a request that the Retirement Commission retroactively allow her to amend the optional election that she took on her day of retirement back in March 2020.

She has requested specifically to remove her ex-husband, her now ex-husband, due to duress and then a large amount of facts that were included in your package as well.

To this point the Retirement Division did respond to her request originally when she reached out to us, and we did deny that request administratively for two reasons, both of which are stated in Assistant Director Helfand's letter. That is Exhibit E of this package.

The first of which is that she did not have the legal right to effectively preclude her husband from this without his waiver. The second is Connecticut General Statute 5-192q, which does provide, similar to the one in Tier A, or sorry, Tier I, that options

cannot be changed once benefit payments have begun.

As Ms. Kajda has begun payments effective in March 2020 and has continued through the present day, we have denied it for those purposes.

The Commission recently did make a decision on a similar claim from Mr. Marone. This took place last year, similar to the situation, and the decision of the Division, it was denied.

MR. CAREY: So, this is Mike Carey. I'll get the discussion going. I thought that the letter prepared by Assistant Director Helfand was really, really clear and spells this out for us, that we just do not have the authority to grant that request. And I certainly would be prepared to vote in that way unless there's anything I'm missing.

MR. DISETTE: I guess I would -- I'm with you,
Mike - but the only thing I guess I would ask is,
does a court have the -- if she went through a
divorce court -- would she have the ability to
overturn this, or does the court not have the
ability to do it either? I don't know the answer to
that at all.

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: I saw Bert take himself off mute.

MR. HELFAND: I was hoping you'd jump in.

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Oh, I can. Yeah. So we've seen this a few times before, you know, when people come and ask for it, because we've done a memo before where -- because I was even thinking about, sort of, contract theories. The problem with contract theories is that we still have the statute, which is very clear, and contract theories cannot override the statute.

However, we did, in one of the -- I think, you know, sometimes we deal with QDROs, and those are court-ordered orders for various types of benefits.

And so I think -- I think if we had a court order, you would follow the court order.

MR. DISETTE: But we don't have -- and we don't have that here.

MR. CAREY: We do not.

MR. HELFAND: And I don't --

MR. KRAYESKE: Cindy, is it possible to also have a court order in a situation like this where the individual, the ex-husband, would be ordered to render payment back to kind of a, you know, a divorce settlement addendum of some kind, where they'd be ordered to pay that money back each month as a way to do that as well?

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: My understanding is that

she's getting the benefit right now. It's a reduced benefit than just if she were to get it. And then if she dies, then he gets the benefit. And what she's asking for is for, you know, in the event she does die and he's still alive, that he doesn't get anything, given their circumstances.

And so certainly the court, you know, I don't know the circumstances of their divorce, but the court could, you know, order him to pay certain types of alimony or other types of payments, depending on their circumstances too.

So, yeah, the court can order anything. You know, they can agree to it or the court order it after a trial in family matters.

MR. KRAYESKE: Okay, I was just thinking of that penalty she's paying for 100%.

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Right.

MR. DISETTE: So, according to the statute, I guess I don't know it well enough, while she can't change her option, does she have the ability to change the contingent? Can we find a way to change the contingent? We can't do that either?

MR. CAREY: Nope.

MR. SEDROWSKI: So, in the event that we allowed that, the pension calculation would then be

completely off based on that, since it takes into account the annuitant's date of birth into the factors.

MR. CAREY: Right.

MR. SEDROWSKI: So that would be the primary concerns in that regard. And why, while it does seem to be a way or simply removing it, it would, you know -- there'd be really no way of reconciling it with the pension without a retroactive adjustment as well.

MR. CAREY: Got it.

MR. DISETTE: So we're kind of stuck.

MR. CAREY: Precisely.

MR. HELFAND: This is not that uncommon a situation. Obviously, people get divorced after retirement, and when they do, they often regret that they've designated their spouse. But, you know, as Ben said, our actuarial assumptions all rely on the status of the parties at the time of the retirement.

MR. CAREY: And John, there even, you know, cases come up where somebody names a contingent annuitant, and the contingent annuitant predeceases the retiree, right? And there are no adjustments then, and the retiree cannot name a replacement contingent in those circumstances, either. So

we're, like you said, we're stuck.

MR. DISETTE: Okay.

MR. CAREY: So, with that, Mr. Chairman, this is Mike Carey, and I would like to make a motion that in the Kajda matter we recommend to the full Commission that they deny her request.

MR. DISETTE: John Disette, I'll second.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All in favor, say aye or raise your hand. Yeah, it's unanimous. The ayes have it.

Okay. Is it Tanvi Kalevar? Did I pronounce it right?

MR. SEDROWSKI: Yes, Mr. Chairman, Tanvi Kalevar is at page 31 of your appeal packet.

Ms. Kalevar is requesting that the Commission permit her to make a new retirement plan election to waive retirement plan membership. She alleges that she was unable to respond in a timely manner on or prior to the first day of her employment to make her election.

In regard to her employment at UConn, she alleges in her complaint as well that she was traveling during the month of April 2025 and then had surgery during that month as well. Due to that, she then missed the reminder emails that UConn had

sent to her that are found in Exhibit B and C.

Ms. Kalevar was hired as a part-time adjunct faculty member in May of 2025. As I stated, she did not submit a CO-931, making an election to waive her retirement plan membership prior to her first day of employment, and as such, UConn then notified her that she had been defaulted, in accordance with the bargaining agreements, to the Alternate Retirement Program at that time.

She then requested that she instead be allowed to waive. That was administratively denied by the agency as well as ourselves, and then she submitted this appeal to you.

MR. DISETTE: Do we know if email was the only form of communication UConn had with her?

MR. SEDROWSKI: That is the only source that UConn said that they sent it to. I will note that they did specifically say it was the email that she provided to them as her primary point of contact.

And I do believe that is cited in Exhibit B.

MR. DISETTE: It was the private email, the home email as well?

MR. KRAYESKE: Yeah, because I don't think she started yet at that point in time, so...

MR. SEDROWSKI: Right, yeah. Right.

MR. CAREY: Because it's got to get to them before she starts, right? Because she's got to have that all -- right -- lined up for day one?

MR. KRAYESKE: Yeah.

MR. SEDROWSKI: I will say that UConn has a substantial employee on boarding website that has multiple links and explanations of the plans, and so on and so forth as well. And that information is provided to them in their, like, alongside their Offer Letter.

So, on top of the individual emails reminding, specifically, retirement-wise, there would have been other information provided to the employee prior to the date of hire.

MR. KRAYESKE: Including the Offer Letter that she got?

MR. SEDROWSKI: Yeah. And then it is Exhibit

C, where Ms. Aman(ph) references the emails that

were sent to the reminder. It says, "Your email was

provided to us as your means of communication during

your on boarding process." So, it doesn't specify

the email address that it was sent to; it's just

citing to the email that she had provided.

MR. KRAYESKE: So, Ben, is the issue that she would have perhaps chosen not to be enrolled in a

1 retirement plan? 2 MR. SEDROWSKI: That is what she's requesting, 3 yes. She's requesting that she would be allowed to waive instead. 4 5 MR. KRAYESKE: And not pay the 65%. 6 MR. SEDROWSKI: Correct. 7 MR. HELFAND: It looks like she had two 8 different occasions for the opportunity within a 9 two-month span. Correct? 10 MR. SEDROWSKI: In regards to --11 MR. HELFAND: Let us know --12 MR. SEDROWSKI: -- which opportunity? Oh, as 13 in like the reminders that were sent from UConn? 14 MR. HELFAND: Right. Right. 15 MR. SEDROWSKI: UConn does cite it saying that 16 they had sent two separate reminders. 17 MR. KRAYESKE: Along with her Offer Letter that 18 had it in there as well when they offered the job. 19 MR. SEDROWSKI: Right. 20 MR. KRAYESKE: So that would be three. This is 21 Dave Krayeske. I don't necessarily see a way for us 22 to adjust what transpired with UConn in this 23 particular instance. 24 You know, the difficulty is that even though we 25 are traveling, most of us have a cell phone where we

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have most of our access to our email, unless we're in Antarctica or some crazy place where Krayeske goes fly-fishing that's off the grid. So, for the most part, it's a tough one to overturn.

MR. CAREY: I agree.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Do we need a motion?

MR. KRAYESKE: Krayeske, I make a motion to deny the request of Kalevar from the University of Connecticut's designation into ARP. Deny the request to reconsider and change that.

MR. CAREY: Carey, second.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion? Hearing none, all in favor say aye or raise your hand. Opposed may or raise your hand. unanimous, the ayes have it. Okay, number C is out. Johnson's out. D is Carla Medina.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Medina is at page 37 of your packet. Ms. Medina has requested that the Retirement Commission permit her to return to Tier IIA after a recent adjustment that placed her into Tier III retroactively.

Ms. Medina was first employed back in November of 2006 as a part-time lecturer. At that time, in January of 2007, the Division did receive a site --a signed CO-931 that elected undecided as her

retirement option.

At that time, individuals were permitted to remain undecided for up to six months in accordance with the policy, and I will touch on that a little bit later, but just as forewarning that was the basis for that at that time.

In response to that, Ms. Medina does state that she did not select "undecided" on her initial CO-931 form at that time and that it was filled in by someone else as the handwriting does not match her own.

However, I do address that as well in stating that it was common practice of the Division at the time that, if it received a form that was blank, it was considered to be an undecided election, at which point the Division would then fill in the undecided and the coding that was required for (indiscernible) at that time and then have it scanned into the employee's record.

Following that, she did terminate employment a few pay periods later in 2006, and then she was not rehired until 2011. I will say in between that period, in 2008, the Division did issue multiple memorandum specifically that ended the undecided election and then put an end to the multiple

elections as well. That was at the time that the Division locked down on the irrevocable election and started enforcing it in full. Ms. Medina was then rehired in 2011. No additional CO-931 was submitted at that time, and, following that period, she remained undecided, as the coding.

She then does not return until 2015. However, in between that period, she did submit another CO-931 in 2013. I will say during this period she did elect Tier IIA on that form. However, in accordance with the policies that I state throughout the memo, Tier III would have been appropriate placement even in that instance.

So, although she had elected SERS Tier IIA, the Division should have placed her into SERS Tier III at that time. She then periodically continued employment in part-time -- as a part-time law enforcement instructor or per diem instructor through 2025, at which point she transferred to a full-time position and then was required to submit a new CO-931.

At that time, the Division did review her record and identified the specific instances that would have led to her placement in Tier 3 being appropriate and then submitted that to the agency as

well as informed the employee of the retroactive change.

Following correspondence between our Division and the employee as well as the agency, she did submit this appeal. I will say that her appeal does specifically focus on that undecided election originally in 2006. However, I do believe the issue turns much more on policy and procedure that has evolved over time as well as those 2008 memos being that cutoff date that I referenced in the undecided elections period.

MR. DISETTE: Ben, based on this record, even if she did select Tier IIA initially back in 2006, by 2013, wouldn't she have only qualified for Tier III?

MR. SEDROWSKI: So, if she had elected Tier IIA originally upon her first hire, then in between 2006 and that one period in 2011 she actually misses a permanent break by about five or six days, if I'm not mistaken. So it's four years, 11 months and so on, so many days.

So, in the event that she had elected originally, Tier IIA would have continued solely based on the earnings record we have.

MR. DISETTE: Got it.

MR. KRAYESKE: And, Ben, what was the process back then for, you know, somebody was deemed undecided? Just nothing? They just sat out there?

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MR. SEDROWSKI: So in regards to the individuals that were commonly listed as undecided, most of them were part-time lecturers. So there was a repeated, you know, basically the system would get pinged each time that new hire would come in for that next semester. And at that time, that was when the Division would likely review the record and then address it and contact the agency to get an election had an election not been made actively at that time, I will say that, you know, knowing what should have taken place and what actually did take place are two separate things where if an agency did not submit a new election form or did not notify the Division specifically of an employee coming on board, there were cases where individuals were left as undecided for extended periods of time, well outside of that six-month window when they were supposed to be forced an election. To that point, that was one of those -- that was one of the problems and evils that was attempted to be remedied under those 2008 memos. And that was why, an additional reason for why that is used as the cutoff date for the plan placement

1 and Tier placement. 2 MR. KRAYESKE: And because she was, during that 3 period of time, in Tier IIA, there was no contributions during that period of time. 4 5 So she -- she was -- so Tier MR. SEDROWSKI: IIA did have contributions at that time. 6 So had she 7 elected it, she would have been required to remit 8 contributions. 9 MR. KRAYESKE: Okay. 10 MR. SEDROWSKI: Tier II didn't have 11 contributions, but Tier IIA did. 12 MR. KRAYESKE: And no -- how do we calculate 13 Is that just the flat-rate contributions that 14 she would have owed at that period of time, or is 15 there an actuarial value we would need to calculate? 16 What would all that look like, just out of 17 curiosity? 18 MR. SEDROWSKI: Yep, standard press -- standard 19 process for any missed mandatory contributions is 20 that it's just billed at the contribution rate. 21 Just the sheer percentage off of the earnings. 22 MR. KRAYESKE: Okay. Those are my questions. 23 Thanks. 24 I will make one last point MR. SEDROWSKI: 25 regarding contributions as well. Just to note that

the transfer from Tier IIA to Tier III does not actually have an impact on the member contribution rate, because the contribution rates were identical.

However, by the Commission moving her to Tier IIA, if it does agree that, you know, she should be moved in placement, it would increase the liability on that pension because of the changes in the FAE, so on and so forth. So it would increase the net benefit that the employee would be receiving.

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: If, obviously, we're kind of looking at this, you know, retrospectively, but we know now that the employees need to make an election by the first day of their employment and if they don't, my understanding is especially these parttime lecturers are defaulted into a plan.

If those rules were in effect at the time of her hire, where would she have been defaulted to, if you know?

MR. SEDROWSKI: Yeah, I'm trying to... So I guess that it would depend on when that default, like, when we're asking about that. So, in the 2008 memos they specifically reference defaulting into SERS for individuals that have remained undecided and have not made a retirement plan election. So, in accordance with that policy at that time, she

would have been defaulted into Tier IIA.

The current policy, as it's evolved, is specific to the bargaining agreement or bargaining unit that oversees it. So each, say, university, would have a different, or could have a different, election, or say the part-time lecturers at UConn will default to ARP compared to ones that would default to Hybrid at a separate university, and so on and so forth.

ATTORNEY CIESLAK: Carl, you're muted.

MR. CHISEM: I was kind of thinking in my head.

Sorry. I mean it doesn't seem to, doesn't seem to

make much difference. But you said about the

liability. That's what I was thinking about.

MR. CAREY: Yeah. And this is -- this is Mike Carey. It looks to me like the policies were applied, and in this particular case, the policy was applied in an appropriate way. And I think that that would mean ultimately that she's properly placed in Tier III.

MR. KRAYESKE: Ben, can you also just go through the reason for the denial of her request, the administrative denial? What was the logic?

MR. SEDROWSKI: So her logic was that she never elected undecided in the first place.

MR. KRAYESKE: No, no - you're logic -- I'm sorry, maybe you're getting there, but okay, your logic for the Retirement Services Division for denying her.

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MR. SEDROWSKI: Oh, so the logic for denying it is that she was incorrectly placed in Tier IIA when she came back and was hired in 2013 or 2015, when she was placed into SERS. Let me just double check the timing of it. Yeah, 2015. So the division's position was that, effective January 22nd, 2015, when she returned to service, she should have been placed in Tier III at that point and was mistakenly placed in Tier IIA because of the prior service, despite there being no election and no contributions. So the division's position was that that was an error that took place then and was just uncovered now, likely because of her per diem employment and the small amount of earnings that are coming in. But I can't confirm why it did not show up on any error report prior.

So, the division's perspective was, despite there being earnings prior to Tier III, her only retirement plan election and earnings took place post-Tier III, and because of that, she should have rightfully been placed in Tier III.

MR. KRAYESKE: Got it. So, that based on her actual election time frame, Tier III was in effect.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Correct.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay.

MR. SEDROWSKI: So, even if we take her first active SERS election, and the first form that we do receive is at a point where she does have no active earnings, there could be a question in regard to that, but even in that instance, she returned after the changeover to Tier III in July of 2011. She returned in December of 2011, and then that election was received later on in 2013. So, both of those dates are already subsequent to Tier III's active enrollment, and so the Division should have placed her in Tier III at that time. That is why, when she requested to return to Tier IIA and stay in IIA as she had been placed since 2015, the Division denied it for that reason.

MR. KRAYESKE: Okay, now I understand. Thank you.

MR. DISETTE: That's the part that confuses me.

By the time she came back, why did they put her in

IIA? What was -- do we have a rationale for why

they thought IIA was appropriate?

MR. SEDROWSKI: I would say that,

unfortunately, tier placement and plan placement problems are one of the most common errors that happen across the division for enrollment or across the state for enrollments in general. And then at that time, because of the nature of the reporting that was going back and forth, it was even less so. Add on to that the complications that arise from part-time lecturers. So I -- I don't have a clear answer for why she was mistakenly placed into it, but I will say that, unfortunately, it is a common error, especially when you look further back.

MR. CHISEM: And maybe you said this, Ben, how long after when she was placed in there that it was picked up?

MR. SEDROWSKI: 10 years.

MR. DISETTE: So she was, I believe, in IIA for 10 years. It's a long time to get the letter.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Oh.

MR. DISETTE: But we're pretty clear that Tier III is the proper place. We're confident that Tier III is the proper place, right?

MR. SEDROWSKI: That's the Division's position. The bigger concern that the Division would also see in regards to this, should this be approved, would be the effect on that 2008 date being binding in

regards to that. So Division practice has been consistent in that being the date that goes back to when plan placement was essentially locked, because prior to that, there was that, you know, everyone could make a new election each time they came in on a new semester, so on and so forth. And the rules were loosely applied because of that. That was locked down in 2008.

So, in the event that, you know, this

Commission would hold, you know that Tier IIA would
be appropriate placement based on those prior
earnings, that would be the concern in regards to
that.

MR. DISETTE: And would she owe the -- back then, it was 2%. Would she owe the 2% from back in the days of 2007, '08, or whatever years they were?

MR. SEDROWSKI: She would, but she had very minimal earnings, so it would -- I believe it was a couple hundred dollars between 2006 and 2011, so it would be minimal contributions that she would be owed, or that she would be required to pay back to the plan. However, she would be required to pay back those for two -- for both the reason of getting the service credit, as well as her Tier IIA election would only be able to be effective should she have

been employed during that time and actively contributing.

MR. DISETTE: So, had she filled out that form way back in 2006 and submitted it with the election of Tier IIA, she would be in Tier IIA now.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Correct. Because at no point she would have had a permanent break that would have ever enabled her to receive a new retirement plan election. As I mentioned earlier from 2006, she's, she's right at that cutoff, but she does come right before the cutoff. So she is back before five years does elapse, and because of that, Tier IIA would continue, and then when she's rehired back in 2011 and then 2015, once again prior to permanent breaks, and then afterwards, she would vest.

MR. DISETTE: That's actually interesting because January 22, 2015 through February of 2025, or January 2025?

MR. SEDROWSKI: That's when she went to the full-time position she was in, or the division notified her of the transfer from Tier IIA to Tier III, or the correction from Tier IIA to Tier III in February of 2025.

MR. DISETTE: At that point, we would have considered her vested, though, in Tier IIA, right?

MR. SEDROWSKI: I would also say that she would likely be vested in Tier III as well at that point.

So, but correct, yes. Both the five years for Tier

IIA and then the 10 years for --

MR. DISETTE: But we were -- we were -- we had her in the status of IIA. We would have considered her vested in IIA at that, like fully vested. So we're pulling away the vested pension and saying that we're going to switch it. We should have switched you over to III. So you weren't really vested. We called you vested. We thought you were, but you weren't. I don't know. I'm uncomfortable both ways. I don't like pulling it, but I don't think she should have ever been in IIA unless she had she checked that box. I'm kind of torn in both ways here.

MR. CAREY: Yeah, John, this is Mike. I hear that concern. I just, to me, if -- this would be a very different situation. I really like the question that you asked about, you know, going back to if she had opted differently in 2006, would she be in Tier IIA now? The answer is yes. But she did not make that election at that point in time. So I think that that key scenario at that point in time kind of sets the table for everything that follows

thereafter. So, I think ultimately, while this is messy and I get what you're saying about the, you know, vested, not vested, I do think Tier III is the proper placement.

MR. DISETTE: Along those lines, though. And Ben, if you know where she was, what was the default? In other words, nobody cared because she left after a month back in 2006. But had she been there for five months, where at her termination, should they have just, what would they have dropped her in? What would they have pretended she actually signed up for?

MR. SEDROWSKI: I don't believe they would have done anything at that point. Default -- default placement wasn't something that was actively in practice at that time, so that was something that came later.

If anything, I would say they would have likely defaulted her as just leaving her blank as either undecided or waived as to something that was also common during the period.

So if an individual came through as a blank form, so on and so forth, deductions are just left unopened and there was no default placement, at least to my knowledge. I have -- I have no

understanding or I have never seen a default placement prior to that.

MR. DISETTE: Okay. I guess I'm kind of leaning towards sticking her to Tier III, but...

MR. KRAYESKE: I would agree with that, John.

MR. CAREY: Is that a motion and a second?

MR. DISETTE: I don't want to make that motion.

MR. CAREY: Well, I'll make it, so, Mr.

Chairman, this is Mike Carey. In the Medina matter,

I move that the Subcommittee recommend to the full

Commission that they deny Ms. Medina's request for

replacement in Tier IIA.

MR. DISETTE: John DiSette, I will second that.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?

Hearing none, all in favor say aye or raise your hand. Opposed nay or raise your hand. It's unanimous, the ayes have it.

Okay, moving on. Craig Swanson.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Okay. Mr. Swanson is on page 54 of your packet. Mr. Swanson is an untimely military purchase, as we have seen in recent times. He's requesting that the Commission either honor his prior application for military purchase that was submitted back in 2020, or the new one that was submitted in 2025, past the one-year deadline that

was associated with such purchases under 5-180B.

He asserts that during his first year of employment, he indicated on his applications to the agency, as well as the on boarding paperwork, that he was a veteran and that he was never informed of the process or the requirements for buying back the time.

He then also asserts that the policy for prior military time to be purchased within the first year of employment is fundamentally flawed and restricts veterans from accessing benefits that they have earned, both of which, unfortunately, are addressed in the statute, and that is the statutory language, as we've seen in the past.

I will state that he was first hired with the state back in 2013. In November, following his date of hire, he did actually submit a 991 Purchase Request Form. He did sign it at the very bottom, underneath the attestation that military service does require to be applied for within one year.

Following that, he then continued in employment. The Division did not receive an additional purchase request that actually requested time until November 12th, 2020.

I will say that it was signed by Mr. Swanson on

June 14, 2018, so I'm not sure where the delay was, if it was the agency error or where that was.

However, 2018 is past the one-year deadline.

So, due to his hire in 2013, letter dated November 16, 2020, RSD did administratively deny that request and told him that it was due to the untimeliness. Nothing came of that until January 2025, when an additional purchase request was submitted.

The Division again administratively denied that by letter, and then Mr. Swanson submitted this appeal to the Commission.

MR. KRAYESKE: Ben, I'm just flipping through his military records. So he had no additional service which would have initiated his 2025 request. Is that accurate?

MR. SEDROWSKI: I'm just flipping through his service, as in like military leave or so on and so forth.

MR. KRAYESKE: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Anything like that?

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: No, not to my knowledge.

MR. KRAYESKE: Okay. I'm just looking at the dates. It looks like it's the 90s, actually, and earlier, so.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Correct. Yes, 84 to 86 and 90 to 91 were the dates that he had gone for.

MR. CAREY: Ben, this is Mike. I have a question. On the form, the CO-991 that he completed in 2013, it says if any required documentation necessary to review this Purchase Request is not enclosed, this application will not be processed and it will be returned to the member. Is there any record of -- in this record, does the Division respond to him and say, Hey, look, we can't process your request? And basically giving him a reminder that he has, you know, a year to do that.

MR. SEDROWSKI: So if he had act -- if he had noted that he did have purchasable time on that form, then, yes, the Division would have contacted --

MR. CAREY: But it's blank. Got it.

MR. SEDROWSKI: Correct. Yes, so essentially, the Division takes this as an attestation that the member basically received the information, essentially providing the protection for, you know, saying that the agency informed them is the goal of that. So please sign this, and we take that as that attestation that you have read this and that you don't have purchasable service that's defined on

1 this form.

MR. CAREY: Based upon the record, I'm not at this point seeing anything that would prompt me to suggest a change to the Division's decision.

MR. SEDROWSKI: And then, just to confirm for the record, the 2020 application did also include time that went up to 2004, so it was post the 90s.

However, it was prior to that 2013 date, so there still was no prior service post that 2013 date, just to confirm for the Trustees.

MR. CAREY: Mr. Chairman, this is Mike Carey. I will make a motion, then, in the Swanson matter, that the subcommittee recommend to the full Commission that they deny Mr. Swanson's request to purchase his military service based upon lack of timeliness.

MR. CHISEM: I'll second.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?

Hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise your hand. Opposed nay or raise your hand. It's unanimous, the ayes have it.

Okay, let's see. It looks like we're down to adjournment.

MR. CAREY: Mr. Chairman, this is Michael Carey. I move to adjourn.

MR. DISETTE: I'll second it. CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It's always unanimous. All in favor, say aye or raise your hand. Thank you all very much. MR. CAREY: Thank you, everybody. CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Nice meeting, Ben. (Meeting adjourned at 10:19 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that the foregoing is, to the best of my skill and ability, a true and accurate transcript of the State of Connecticut State Employees' Retirement Board, Purchase of Service Subcommittee held on July 24, 2025. Wendy Malitaky Wendy Malitsky My commission expires March 31, 2030