STATE OF CONNECTICUT

STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PURCHASE OF SERVICE & RELATED MATTERS MEETING

OCTOBER 4, 2022 MEETING HELD VIA ZOOM CONVENED AT 1:02 p.m.

Present:

Peter Adomeit, Chairman

Carl Chisem, Trustee

Robert Coffey, Trustee

John DiSette, Trustee

John Herrington, Retirement Services Division Director

Colin Newman, Retirement Services Division Assistant Director

Robert Helfand, Retirement Services Division Assistant Director

Pat Meskers, Retirement Services Division Assistant Division

Director

Cindy Cinalak Conoral Counsel to Betirement Commission Base

Cindy Cieslak, General Counsel to Retirement Commission, Rose Kallor LLP

Robert Krzys, Representing Ms. Spak
David Rintoul, Representing Mr. Bruno
Frank Bruno
Christine Spak
James Vasquez
Cynthia Washburn
Mike Lopez

TRANSCRIPTIONIST: Karin A. Empson

(Proceedings commenced at 1:02 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Well, good afternoon, everyone. Because we're being recorded, please state your name when you talk. So I'm Peter Adomeit. This is the State Employees Retirement Commission Purchase of Service & Related Matters Subcommittee meeting by teleconference on October the 4th, 2022 at 1:00 in the afternoon.

Cindy, do you have the attendance, please?

MS. CIESLAK: Certainly. Good afternoon.

This is Cindy Cieslak. Present today, we have Chairman Peter Adomeit, Trustee Carl Chisem, Trustee Robert Coffey, Trustee John Disette; from the Retirement Services Division, we have John Herrington, Robert Helfand, Colin Newman, and Pat Meskers. And I am General Counsel from Rose Kallor. Present from the public or for matters which are on the agenda, we have Attorney Robert Krzys, Jim Vasquez, Christine Spak, Frank Bruno, Attorney David Rintoul, and Cynthia Washburn.

I believe that is everyone.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. We can proceed to

the agenda. The first item is Justin Baldwin.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman. The

Justin Baldwin matter was tabled from the meeting on

June 14th of this year. Essentially, Mr. Baldwin is

somebody that is looking to get retirement credit for

his period of prior military service. From our

records, it appeared that Mr. Baldwin had been offered

a last-chance opportunity to make this purchase back in

2012, but he never responded to that last-chance

opportunity, and as such, the Division closed his file.

I will say that in that last-chance opportunity matter,

clear instructions were provided to say that if there

was no response, there may not be like a further

opportunity to purchase this period of service.

He did submit another application in May of 2021 requesting retirement credit for the same period of prior military service. The Division administratively denied it on the basis that it was untimely as the application should have been submitted at least within one year of his date of hire. Mr. Baldwin made a claim. He appealed the Division's administrative denial. He had indicated that he had been - he was activated with the Marine Corps at the time of when the last-chance letter was sent to him, and, you know, he did indicate that he had not actually

returned to the State of Connecticut until June 2012, approximately one month after the letter had been sent.

The reason why it was tabled was the trustees wanted to give him the opportunity to provide additional information as to advise on what he was doing, what happened to his mail while he was away. He provided a notarized statement dated August 23rd, and that's been provided for the trustees to review to see if that will help in making a recommendation.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah, the letter said he was in Afghanistan, or the affidavit, I mean; right?

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin - yes - Colin Newman. Yes, he indicated that he was in Afghanistan, and the only mail that he received while he was out there were like care packages.

MR. COFFEY: Colin, this is Bob Coffey. I reviewed the letter and it appears to me that it is the kind of letter that we have accepted in previous cases with the - on the belief that there were extenuating circumstances that prevented him from being able to respond in a timely manner. Do you agree with that?

MR. NEWMAN: Yes, there have been cases in the past where the Commission has arrived at the decision because of it was an extenuating - you know, the particular extenuating circumstance that the person

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     was experiencing.
                MR. COFFEY: In that case, I believe this is
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     something that the Subcommittee should recommend
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     approval to the full Commission.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Is there any
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     further discussion? Okay, hearing none, are the
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     members of the Commission on the Subcommittee ready to
     take a vote? We will need a motion.
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                MR. COFFEY: This is Bob Coffey. I move that
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     we recommend to the Commission that it approve the
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     request of Justin Baldwin.
                MR. CHISEM: Second, Bob Chisem.
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                MR. DISETTE: I second that. I apologize.
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     John DiSette. I'll second that.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Is there any
     further discussion? Okay, hearing none, all in favor,
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     say aye or raise your hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Opposed, nay or raise your
     hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The ayes have it.
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                Okay. Now, just wait just one second while I
     try to solve a problem here. Zoom has - it's a
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     treacherous program. Well, I'll just go on.
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The next item on the agenda, Frank Bruno.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman again. I don't know if you want Mr. Bruno and/or his attorney to present first, or would you like me to give the background?

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Why don't you give us the background and then we will hear from the attorney.

MR. NEWMAN: Okay. This is Colin Newman.

Frank Bruno was - became employed with DMHAS at

Connecticut Valley Hospital as a staff unit pharmacist on October 19th, 2012. And pursuant to the SEBAC agreement of 2011, his retirement plan membership was that of a Tier III member. And in March of 2022, the Division received a written request from Mr. Bruno's attorney requesting a transfer of his retirement plan membership from Tier III to Tier IIA. The claim is that, while it's understood that Mr. Bruno's date of employment placed him in Tier III, the contention is that, you know, the belief was that he would have been offered his position and he would have accepted that position prior to that date, in which Tier III was mandatory, which was July 1 of 2011.

The reason why - the argument was that back in April 2011, Mr. Bruno was interviewed as a candidate for the position of a staff unit pharmacist and

Attorney Rintoul has provided a sworn affidavit from the individual who chaired the committee that did the interviews, and he had confirmed that Mr. Bruno would have - was the recommended candidate whose name was forwarded to Human Resources, but he did state that he never heard - he didn't hear anything about Mr. Bruno's candidacy after his name had been forwarded.

At the end of the fiscal year, the State had instituted a hiring freeze. And Mr. Bruno's attorney is arguing that that hiring freeze should not have adversely affected the ability of Mr. Bruno's retirement plan membership and that he should become a member of - be allowed to be in Tier IIA because of the fact that - the belief is that he would have been hired prior to the - he would have been hired prior - even if the hiring freeze took effect.

The Retirement Division did respond to the written request and administratively denied the request stating that Mr. Bruno was placed appropriately in the Tier III plan, however the attorney was advised that the Division - that if he wanted to pursue the matter, it would be - it could be petitioned to the Retirement Commission. And on June 8th of this year, Attorney Rintoul requested such review by the Commission. So that's where we are today.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Excuse me. Thank you. Peter Adomeit.

Attorney Rintoul, you have the floor.

MR. RINTOUL: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. I believe Attorney Newman well summarized our factual basis. It was through no fault of Mr. Bruno that he did not participate in Tier IIA. He had passed the medical exam, which was the last stage for his hiring. Due to the intervention of the freeze, he was not hired to a position he subsequently was hired into and where he served for with exemplary service through the Covid emergency.

Therefore it's inequitable that because solely due to the existence of the hiring freeze he was prevented from participating in Tier IIA. So we request that he be permitted, that this allowance be made to allow his participation in Tier IIA, particularly since the hiring manager has certified that, has sworn that Mr. Bruno was the choice for the position, therefore leading to that he would have had this position but for the hiring freeze.

I would be happy to answer any questions that any Commission members have.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Mr. Herrington, do you

have any questions?

MR. HERRINGTON: I do not.

3 MR. RINTOUL: I have nothing further if no 4 members of the Commission have questions.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Well, I have one. And that is since he was actually hired on a different date, how can we give him an earlier date, which is not the date that he was hired on?

MR. RINTOUL: Right.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Do you understand the problem?

MR. RINTOUL: Right. Well, I believe that in the similar way that the Commission showed leniency with deadlines in the earlier matter on this agenda, that the Commission has the power to make this allowance to remedy the injustice of Mr. Bruno being deprived of Tier II participation solely due to the intervention of the hiring freeze.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right. Thank you.

MR. COFFEY: This is Bob Coffey. Colin, point of information here. The hiring freezes have been somewhat common over the last couple of decades that you've been around. Have there been situations in the past where all of the recommendations for hire are complete on a date when one tier was open, but the

person didn't get hired until the new tier became effective; has the Commission ever used a prior effective date prior than, you know, the actual appointment date to grant somebody that kind of treatment?

MR. NEWMAN: No. This is Colin. I'm not sure about with respect to like hiring freezes, but a similar case has come before the Commission. It was in the matter of Janet Columbia (phonetic). This was back at September 20th, 2006. It was a similar claim where the individual indicated that she was offered State employment prior to July 2nd of 1984. However, that — so she actually started her date of employment on that particular day, which was the day, of course, that was mandatory for Tier II membership. And basically the Commission came up with — basically made a decision noting that the actual date of hire determines the plan membership regardless of when the employment was offered.

MR. COFFEY: Thanks, Colin.

MR. NEWMAN: All right.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah, Peter Adomeit here again. I'm looking at John Herrington's denial letter and it states as a basis for permitting Mr. Bruno to participate in Tier IIA, your letter states after the

State hiring freeze, Mr. Bruno would have started State service in June 2011 at exactly the same job he was hired for in 2012. That statement might be correct, but the rules governing SERS do not authorize us to base a member's tier replacement on counterfactuals. For whatever reason, Bruno was not enrolled in SERS until 2012 and for that reason, he is ineligible for membership in Tier IIA.

Mr. Herrington, do you care to comment on that?

MR. HERRINGTON: I would say that that's exactly the way that we analyzed this is that we deal with actual facts. We apply actual facts to the existing provisions and I'm certainly not aware of any situations where the Division has kind of entertained those types of alternatives to establish a plan membership. I think that there may have been some situations in the past where the parties may have reached certain exceptions to the rules with respect to not the selection of a candidate, but the extension of an actual offer.

I do believe that in the transition from Tier III to Tier IV, there was a relatively small population of individuals who were offered employment in the education context in higher ed. So they were offered

jobs in the spring of 2017 to start in the fall semester of 2017, and within those offer letters, it was stated that those members would participate in Tier III in the intervening months. Tier IV was created and the cutoff date for Tier IV occurred prior to the actual hiring. That's the only situation that I'm aware of where this type of change in plan based on an offer would have applied.

So, so far as I understand the facts here however, there was no formal offer that was extended to Mr. Bruno at that time. And it seems as though there is quite a difference in terms of the length of period. For that one population, we were talking about people where the change occurred over the course of a summer. This is over the course of many years, or at least, more than a year.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Are there any further comments or questions? Any further discussion? Is the Commission ready to make a decision? Bob Coffey.

MR. COFFEY: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would move that we recommend to the full commission that it deny Mr. Bruno's request.

MR. DISETTE: John DiSette. I'll second that.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Is there any further

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discussion? Hearing none, all in favor of the motion
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     signify by raising your hand or saying aye.
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                (No audible response)
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Opposed, nay or raise your
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     hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The motion carries.
     Petition is denied.
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               MR. DISETTE: Question for the Chair, if I
     may. Do you want executive session for discussion, or
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     do you want to leave it in open session?
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: I'm sorry. Where did the
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     question come from?
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                MR. DISETTE: Oh, John DiSette. I apologize
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     to the Chair. Did you want us to request executive
     session for discussion, or leave it in open session?
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Well, I had discussed that
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     very question at length today with Cindy Cieslak, our
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     counsel. And the practice has been to have these in
     open session. And so that is - I'm following that
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     practice.
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                Okay?
                MR. DISETTE: Yes. John DiSette. Thank you.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: You're welcome. Yeah,
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     there are other subcommittees like Overpayments, for
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example, when we go into the tax returns and the
information on whether they can afford to pay and so
on, and we hold executive sessions on that
subcommittee. But the practice on this one is to do it
in open session.

Moving on.

MS. CIESLAK: Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yes.

MS. CIESLAK: Mr. Chairman, this is Cindy Cieslak. If you'd like, I can make a brief comment further on that.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Please do. Go ahead.

MS. CIESLAK: And so, Trustee DiSette, what I would say is that ordinarily, these matters are in public session because they generally concern what would otherwise be public record, such as dates of employment and tier placement. However, in the event there is grounds for us to be in executive session, we certainly can go into executive session.

Some of those grounds may include, you know, in instances where the subcommittee has requested a written legal opinion. Other instances have been where we would actually discuss matters that would otherwise be exempt from FOI, such as, you know, personnel or medical records that would constitute an invasion of

public - or of personal privacy if they were disclosed to the public. And so it's not - you know, just for the record, I want to note that it's not automatic that we have to have everything in public session, but unless there is grounds for an executive session that is authorized under the Freedom of Information statute, the practice has been to hold these meetings in public session.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Thank you, Cindy.

I'm just reviewing the background case history on the next case, Kevin Cribley, and there doesn't appear to be anything there of a medical or personal nature. So thank you very much.

We can move on to Kevin Cribley.

MR. NEWMAN: Okay, this is Colin Newman.

Mr. Cribley initially applied and made a timely application for his prior military service. He was applying for his almost 12 years of service. At the time of his application, basically the dates of his service, not all of them would have been eligible.

The Division initially sent an invoice in 2004, and then they sent a subsequent invoice in 2006, which was the result of the calculation of the cost had changed, and the letter provided that was given to Mr. Cribley giving the explanation was in the packet.

It doesn't appear that Mr. Cribley had responded to either invoice. So in February of 2012, he was sent a last-chance opportunity to purchase this period of time. And at that time, because of the change in the federal designation of the war dates, he actually was now eligible to purchase up to the maximum of 10 years of prior military service.

responded to the letter requesting an invoice for his service. The invoice was sent to him in March of 2012. Mr. Cribley did not respond to that invoice. As such, as in the first case, the Division ended up closing his file because he didn't respond within the timeframe offered.

with another application requesting for his prior military service. In December of '21, the Division administratively denied the application due to the untimeliness. Mr. Cribley appealed his letter - I'm sorry, appealed by letter in March of this year. He's claiming that he did make a timely request, which is not in question here, and that for purposes of his employment, he received credit for his prior military for seniority and longevity purposes, and he provided like a paystub to show that he was getting longevity,

and he sent a page from the State of Connecticut

payroll manual to show that he was eligible for it.

And again, nobody is questioning that. It's just the fact that he never responded to the invoice, therefore he was permanently, as stated in the letter, permanently - basically not allowed to be able to purchase that time. So it was sent to the Subcommittee for a recommendation.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right. Thank you, Colin.

Is there any discussion?

MR. COFFEY: Colin, is there anything here that we can hook onto for extenuating circumstances?

MR. NEWMAN: I mean, looking at the fact that he provided, you know, his record regarding his seniority and longevity, you know, I guess you could initially assume that he thought he already had it. But the fact of the matter is he must have been informed that he still had not, he still did not have credit for it. And he was - and he probably was inquiring because of the fact he did retire June 1 of this year under hazardous duty, and he was looking to basically firm up all of the service credit that might be - he may be eligible for.

But, you know, other than that, the fact of

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the matter is he didn't respond to the invoice.
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     did try to argue, I guess, in the beginning when he
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     didn't respond to the first two invoices the fact of
     the matter he had moved, but at the time of that, the
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     last invoice in 2012 only - there was less than a
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     month from the time that we sent the letter and then
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     we sent the invoice.
                So, yeah, I can't see any extenuating
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     circumstance other than what I've mentioned
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     previously.
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                MR. COFFEY: In that case, I'd like to make
     a motion that we recommend to the Commission that it
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     deny the Cribley request.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Is there a second?
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                MR. CHISEM: Carl Chisem, second.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?
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     Hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise your
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     hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Opposed, nay or raise
     your hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The ayes have it.
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                All right, next item on the agenda is
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     Michael Leary.
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Mr. Newman?

MR. NEWMAN: Actually, I'm going to ask Patricia Meskers if she could (inaudible).

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Oh, okay. My apologies.

MR. NEWMAN: That's okay. Patty?

MS. MESKERS: Good afternoon. Michael Leary is looking to change his retirement date back to July 1st. He had intended to retire on July 1st. He had email - he has - or he was a DSS employee, a health program associate, and he was looking to retire July 1st. He sent an email to the DAS benefits and leaves pod on June 12th to tell them of his intention. He submitted a form. Unfortunately, the form was blank when it got to the DAS benefits and leaves pod. The DAS benefits and leaves pod responded on June 16th that he would have approximately 60 to 90 days prior to the retirement date to complete the forms.

On June 20th, he had dropped off some paperwork to the pod, but it was not the intent, which is what the pod uses to create a retirement application. So he had done his marital form that was notarized. He had a birth certificate. He had a video showing a picture of an envelope being placed into the DAS benefits and leaves pod. The benefits and leaves pod hadn't found any paperwork. So on July

5th, they had contacted us and the Comptroller's Office without an application and an option form cannot accept the retirement. So we had responded to the pod that if they provide an affidavit stating the factual basis of why that should be accepted, we could do that.

They didn't feel that they were the necessary party who had created the issue, so they chose not to do that. I contacted the member and said, let's do your retirement paperwork so we can get you on the payroll so this can be seen before the Commission. So he is retired as of September 1st. We had done the paperwork, but he is looking to remedy the fact that he would like to go back to a July 1st retirement, which was his intent. Excuse me.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: And could you state the advantages to him of the earlier date?

MS. MESKERS: Oh, John, did you want to - okay.

MR. HERRINGTON: Yeah, that was the point that I was going to make is that, you know, to the extent that we receive these in the past, if there is kind of agency explanation for an administrative error that has delayed someone's retirement date, we will typically honor those requests. And in most cases,

the difference would just be an additional month of retirement credit. In this case, as I think we all know, there were some significant changes that went into effect on July 1st. So this case, the importance of the change in retirement date is much greater than it is in the normal course, because this person will be subject to COLA under a different set of rules so that they would receive a COLA much earlier and there would be a guaranteed minimum.

I'm not certain as I speak, Patty, I believe that this individual would not be subject to the early retirement grid or the age.

MS. MESKERS: You're correct.

MR. HERRINGTON: All right. So the large issue would be to the extent that there is a change in Medicare reimbursement in the future, that would have a financial impact to this individual, but the largest issue would be that this individual would be eligible for a COLA next July 1st guaranteed to be a minimum of two percent. Otherwise, he wouldn't be eligible for a cost-of-living adjustment for another two-and-a-half years and there would be no minimum COLA.

MS. MESKERS: I would also state, this employee was assuming he was retired July $1^{\rm st}$. He was out on unauthorized unpaid leave from the end of June

until we got him on the retirement payroll for September 1st. So he had not received any pay from the agency during that time.

MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey. John, putting aside the big issue, is this the kind of case that you would have allowed the person to take the earlier date, you know, under the facts of the case?

MR. HERRINGTON: Right, right, right. So I think that the issue here is that we didn't get the full story or, you know, a commitment from the agency or the pod for administrative error at the time. It does seem that over time, from the initial submission of the application and the affidavit that we eventually received from the pod, there were some additional facts that came to light. Because I think this case, at first, the only information that we had kind of indicated that the paperwork was submitted in time was a video that was not time/date stamped and we couldn't corroborate that.

And at the time, the DAS pod could not locate the member's retirement paperwork. So we didn't have enough to establish that this individual had submitted their retirement paperwork on time. Subsequent to that, a couple of weeks later, or perhaps it might have been, you know, about a month or

so, the retirement pod was able to find the 2 individual's retirement paperwork.

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So that did corroborate the fact that he had at least delivered that paperwork, whether it was prior to the deadline or not, we don't know. But it was a stronger fact than what we had at the time. And had the pod kind of supported the claim for the honoring of the retirement date in real time, we would have honored that date without coming to the Commission.

MR. COFFEY: This is not the only case we have from this pod?

MR. HERRINGTON: Right, thankfully so, right? We have another one to discuss today. Considering the fact that we were instituting this new process with the pod and with this high volume, I actually anticipated that we would encounter this situation, you know, in much greater numbers. But so far, these are the only two that have come to light as of this point.

And I would say, you know, in terms of the facts of the case, in both of those cases, had we had affidavits from the pod initially establishing agency error, we probably would have honored both of those dates.

MR. COFFEY: I'm wondering out loud here whether we might want to table these cases if for nothing else to see whether or not we have more coming from this particular pod with respect to this particular issue. And it may enter into our judgment a little bit if we see the same kind of thing happening from the same source.

So I'm wondering is there a rush here, or should we wait until we see what develops with any further cases or with these cases that we have.

MR. HERRINGTON: I guess my one response to that would be I think that in Mr. Leary's case, that would mean that we were withholding at least one or two months' retirement checks from him. But the holdup wouldn't take place until, you know, next July anyway, so there wouldn't be much of a change there.

Are those facts the same for the first one, Patty? Was that an August $1^{\rm st}$ retirement that that actually occurred?

MS. MESKERS: Yeah, the next one is August $1^{\rm st}$ and he is looking to be the July $1^{\rm st}$ as well.

MR. HERRINGTON: Did you have any sense,

Patty, in terms of the possible population that's out
there of other ones in the pipeline? I mean, you
communicate with the pod rather frequently.

MS. MESKERS: Right. I don't - they haven't submitted any forward, so none that I'm aware of. And I would think by now we should at least be aware of them, but I can reach out.

MR. HERRINGTON: I guess my question for you, Bob, would be would that change the outcome in these cases if there were more of these cases out there? Would you be more inclined to grant this relief, or would you be reluctant to grant the relief if there's a larger number?

MR. COFFEY: Well, my thought is if we find a lot of agency error coming out of pod five, I'd be more inclined, you know, to think that maybe there was some here. In looking at the affidavit from Jessica Kudla (phonetic), it doesn't appear to me that they're willing to accept any claim of agency error. And ordinarily, that would be enough. The reason why I'm just thinking more about this is really because we know of two and there may be more.

But, I mean, I could act on this one now, and I probably would deny based on what we have here before us. But if there are other cases coming up that show similar kinds of circumstances where the paperwork just couldn't be found for a while and we're not sure what the paperwork said on a particular date

and all that kind of stuff, then I might feel differently.

MR. HERRINGTON: Okay. Yeah, I would wonder aloud whether it makes sense to hear both of those cases because there are slight deviations in the facts, in the affidavits in this case and the other similar case. But, I mean, I don't know whether there's any way for us to kind of flush that out, Patty, in terms of how many other potential problems are out there. I mean, I'm of the same mind, that I would have expected that we would have received any of those claims already.

I can get - it gets more complicated to the extent that there are future cases that come forward. I think in both of these cases, as Patty stated, it's much easier to resolve this if someone submits retirement paperwork in July, believes that they are retired, and they aren't receiving pay during that time period. Any other situations that would come to light where someone may or may not have submitted that retirement paperwork, but remained on the payroll, and remained on the payroll from June - or from July 1st until now, I think it would really limit our ability to remedy that situation.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: John DiSette, you had

1 your hand up. 2 MR. DISETTE: Yeah. John, just so that I'm 3 clear though, there was paperwork that was eventually 4 found, not redelivered; right? Or don't (inaudible). MR. HERRINGTON: Right, right, right. My 5 understanding is that there was paperwork that was 6 7 found at the pod and that indicated that the pod had 8 that paperwork in their possession at some time. I don't think that there's a way to conclude 9 10 conclusively that that was submitted and received 11 prior to the deadline. But it's a much stronger case 12 than it appeared originally, yes. MR. DISETTE: But at the same time, he also 13 did not show up for work on July 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th; 14 15 right? Exactly, exactly. 16 MR. HERRINGTON: MR. DISETTE: So you discover found 17 paperwork; he didn't show up after the date that he 18 19 said he was going to retire; and then on top of that, 20 he had a video. This is the guy that had the video; right? 21 22 MR. HERRINGTON: Correct.

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MR. DISETTE: Even though the video is not very clear, it's a bland envelope being stuffed in.

Presumably, it would make sense that that was the

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     paperwork and he was smart enough to capture it on
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     film. Otherwise the conclusion is that he
     surreptitiously somehow went into the office and
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     dropped blank pieces of paper into an envelope; right?
     And those blank pieces of paper were never found
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     within an envelope.
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                I'm inclined to accept that this guy tried
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     to submit his paperwork. It might have gotten
     misplaced, put under a pile of other ones. I'm
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     inclined to accept what he was trying to do and
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     thought he - and most likely thought he had done.
     That's my feeling on it. I don't see a need to wait.
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     I'm willing to accept this as it is. Thank you.
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                And I apologize. John DiSette.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.
               MR. HERRINGTON: Yeah, I mean, not to
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     belabor the point, but I viewed this case much
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     differently once that paperwork was found.
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               MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey. I'm convinced.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Do you want to
     make the motion, or do you want to second it?
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                MR. COFFEY: I'll let John second it - I'll
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     let John make it.
                MR. DISETTE: All right. If it makes it
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     easier for you, Bob. I'd like to make the motion to
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accept the change to a July 1st retirement date. 1 2 MR. COFFEY: I'll second. 3 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion? Hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise your 4 hand. 5 (No audible response) 6 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Opposed, nay or raise 7 your hand. 8 9 (No audible response) 10 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The ayes have it. The 11 motion carries. Okay, moving on to Giovanni Letterri. Mr. 12 Newman? 13 MS. MESKERS: This is Patty Meskers. I'll 14 15 just go again. It is the same similar type of case with looking for a July 1st date. The person is 16 actually retired as of August 1st. This case, the 17 individual's daughter was communicating with the pod. 18 19 So she was emailing the pod. They emailed the pod on June 6th for the July 1st retirement. She followed up 20 again on June 8th and again on June 23rd, but she was 21 following up with the pod from her email address. 22 23 The pod was communicating with the member through his email address. That came from the intent, 24

so it was kind of just a miscommunication of emails.

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And so he was thinking he was set for retirement. The pod was saying, no, you're not all set, but two different email addresses. And no one had responded to the daughter at that email address to state, please refer to the email address that was in the original intent for communication. So it was sort of a backand-forth kind of thing.

But he did put in the intent. He did submit some paperwork, not the completed paperwork. So the fact that the completed paperwork wasn't here on time, we couldn't accept the retirement. His is slightly different because the agency again thought he was retiring. So they ended up putting him on a leave of absence, leave in lieu of accruals. But then after it wasn't accepted, they then put him on sick leave until the end of July, so for the first period.

So in June, as of June 17th, he was off the payroll. But then, being that it wasn't accepted for July, his agency put him back on using accruals to get him through the end of July. So he did have accruals paid for that period because he wasn't retired. The pod did his retirement for August 1st.

MR. HERRINGTON: And I believe when one (inaudible) materials but not necessarily in the summary is that there was a definite need for the pod

to communicate with the daughter, that the member had
had an injury and wasn't fully capable of kind of
completing the paperwork on his own.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, John. Thank you, Patty.

Is there any further discussion? John DiSette?

MR. DISETTE: I'd just like to further what John just added there. Part of the hang up here with Giovanni - I am familiar with this. Part of the hang up is that he did - he fell off a ladder and got hurt, and he had spent time in the hospital, and that's why his daughter was reaching out to finish his retirement paperwork and that's how you ended up with the two different emails.

So he was injured. He was basically unavailable. His daughter was trying to finish it up and that's where the - a little bit of the confusion came in. And he did try to finish this up in late June. He did think for the most part it was done, and it just - you know, for whatever reason, it - all the paperwork wasn't submitted properly, or reached out and the communication wasn't there.

But he was certainly trying to retire for July 1.

1 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, John. 2 further discussion? 3 MS. CIESLAK: This is Cindy Cieslak. actually have a question. 4 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Go ahead. 5 MS. CIESLAK: This is Cindy. Did I hear 6 7 that he was paid during the period of July 1 to July 31st? 8 9 MS. MESKERS: This is Patty Meskers. The agency, once he wasn't approved for the July 10 retirement, put him on a leave in lieu of accruals and 11 ended up putting him back on sick time, yes. So he 12 got accruals, not regular pay. 13 MS. CIESLAK: And then my question then, I 14 15 quess, would be to John Herrington is that typical while employees are trying to retire, and it that 16 generally permitted under (inaudible)? 17 MR. HERRINGTON: Right, yeah, right, right. 18 19 Yeah, it certainly is atypical that that occurs. I 20 would say, right, to some degree, right, whether this is, you know, similar to individuals using their 21 22 accruals while their disability claim is pending, you 23 know, that's the closest that I can think of. But, yes, this was, you know, I think, completely different 24

than the normal course because this person didn't

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1 retire in the normal course.

Patty, are you aware of that determination being made by the individual's agency as opposed to the pod?

MS. MESKERS: This is Patty Meskers. I am not aware. I made the assumption that it is the agency, just the way it was done by the leave in lieu of accruals.

MR. HERRINGTON: Right. And one explanation would be the concern about continued health insurance.

MS. MESKERS: Health insurance, right, exactly.

MS. CIESLAK: This is Cindy Cieslak. John and Patty, thank you for that explanation.

MR. COFFEY: This is Bob Coffey. Question for John. If he did collect sick pay during this time, can we also give him retirement payments on top of that?

MR. HERRINGTON: That is the issue that's complicating. As I said, if we had others, I mean, I think that there might be a remedy for that to the extent that he were to pay back any sick time that he was paid, that that might be a remedy. But, yes, I mean, that is problematic, for someone to receive active pay after their retirement, unless, I mean - to

the extent that, I mean, if we're being creative, we can consider him a reemployed retiree to be on sick leave for three weeks. I mean, it would take some creativity to remedy that situation.

MS. CIESLAK: This is Cindy Cieslak. John, you had mentioned how - and it - you know, I now recall from prior cases about how when individuals apply for disability retirement, sometimes they are permitted to essentially bridge the time between them not being able to work and them applying for disability retirement using sick leave and other types of leave.

Are there instances where the individual's retirement date - and maybe the right question isn't are there instances. Is it ordinary for the individual's retirement date on disability to overlap with the time period that they got sick pay? Because I know there's a special rule for the disability retirees that the Commission has approved.

(Inaudible)

MR. HERRINGTON: Right, right, right. It is not. Right. So in that instance, to the extent that someone's using their sick leave accruals while their disability claim is pending, right, we would shift their retirement date to coincide largely with the

1 date of approval, which would also coincide with the 2 ending of their sick or vacation payments. 3 MS. CIESLAK: Thank you for that 4 clarification. This is Cindy. CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Peter Adomeit. 5 there any further discussion? 6 7 MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey. Question for John again. Logistically, how does it happen that he would 8 have to reimburse the State for his sick leave? 9 isn't really something that the Commission has any 10 11 control over; is it? MR. HERRINGTON: Right, right. It certainly 12 is not anything that the Commission would have control 13 over. I think it might be possible however for the 14 15 Commission - although, I think, what we're talking about here are a number of exceptional circumstances. 16

is not anything that the Commission would have control over. I think it might be possible however for the Commission - although, I think, what we're talking about here are a number of exceptional circumstances. But I can conceive of a Commission decision that would be contingent upon him paying back that time, and to the extent that with the agency that can be remedied, that then we could accept that direction from the Commission.

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But, yes, it would take quite a bit of maneuvering to resolve this.

MS. CIESLAK: And this is Cindy Cieslak.

I'll just note that should the trustees want to

fashion some sort of relief that's conditioned upon certain things that are not necessarily within the purview of the Commission, I - you know, it's to be determined whether that can be accomplished, because I think there might be various issues related to collective bargaining and wage-an-hour law and sick pay laws that may impact this. So-

MR. HERRINGTON: Right, yeah.

MS. CIESLAK: And I'm not the state's attorney, so I can't even speak on that.

MR. HERRINGTON: Right.

MS. CIESLAK: But it's just, you know, something that I'm, you know, thinking of when we have other matters where individuals want to retire, but they've also worked, and ordinarily you cannot, you know, receive pay for your work, and granted, this individual wasn't working, but you can't get your retirement benefit at the same time you've also received pay for work.

So those are sort of issues that I see that are part of this question as well.

MR. HERRINGTON: Yeah, right. And I'm glad that you made that distinction, Cindy. Because I thought through the same issue with respect to the wage-an-hour and you're focused on the fact that it

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     was the use of sick leave accruals as opposed to time
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     actually worked.
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                MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey. Based then on this
     entire discussion, I'd like to move that we table this
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     matter for referral to the personnel in the litigation
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     subcommittee for their review.
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                MR. HERRINGTON: That makes sense to me.
     The one issue that I would add would be, the thought
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     would be that to the extent that those are issues that
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     could be resolved, those issues would be resolved by
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     the Legal & Personnel Subcommittee and that it
     wouldn't require a second referral back to this
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     subcommittee.
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                MR. COFFEY: That's fine with me.
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                MR. HERRINGTON: Okay.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It would or would not?
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     It would, I take it.
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                MR. COFFEY: Would not have to come back
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     here. Once the-
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Oh, yeah. I
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     misunderstood.
                MR. COFFEY: --Legal & Personnel
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     Subcommittee makes a recommendation to the full
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CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right. That's the

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motion. Is there a second?

MR. CHISEM: Bob Chisem. I'll second it.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Is there any further

discussion? Hearing none, all in favor of the motion-

MR. DISETTE: Actually, I-

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: John?

MR. DISETTE: I apologize. John Disette. I guess, Bob, I'm a little unclear. Why wouldn't we make a decision now? Not that somebody else can't look at it, but why would the process be upheld here? Can we still refer it over to another subcommittee and still take action on this today? I mean, we have to -we should be indicating to them whether we're willing to accept this; right? I mean, if we're going to say no to it, then why send it over there in the first place?

Shouldn't we take an action here and make a referral over?

MR. COFFEY: I understand that. I wanted to avoid taking an action that would put it before the Commission ahead of the Legal & Personnel Subcommittee dealing with the legal issues that Cindy raised. I think the consensus here is that we are in favor of approval, if we can deal with this legal issue of what do we do concerning his receipt of sick pay. Once

that's resolved, I don't think the Legal & Personnel Subcommittee is in a position to substitute itself for, you know, our views here. If you think we should include in the motion something to the effect that we're-

MR. DISETTE: Subject to review?

MR. COFFEY: --yeah, just - yeah, sending it over approving it subject to review of Legal & Personnel. I just don't want it to have to hit the Commission before it hits the Legal & Personnel Subcommittee.

MR. HERRINGTON: Just one point that kind of occurred to me as I'm thinking through the issues would be one distinction, I think, between this and the disability cases that we're discussing would be just about every individual that retired July 1st received sick leave pay in the second pay period of July, right? Most individuals are entitled to one quarter of their sick leave payout. So in that regard, this individual would look on paper the same as any other July 1st retiree.

I mean, I guess there's the question that, you know, that was paid and was allocated, you know, in full, as opposed to one quarter over, you know, a course of a pay period. But on paper, right, this

transaction would look exactly the same as any other retiree, and there would just need to be an adjustment for, you know, the one quarter of the sick leave payout as opposed to the allocation of sick pay over maybe 10 days.

MR. COFFEY: In other words, John, what you're saying is that the amount that he received as sick pay, really all that has to happen is it comes out of the one quarter that he's entitled to anyway.

MR. HERRINGTON: Correct. Correct. I think that that would be slightly different if this extended on for two or three months, but it's all in the same month. It's the same as it would be for any other retiree.

MR. COFFEY: Then I would ask Cindy, does that resolve the legal issues, Cindy, that you thought should be taken a look at?

MS. CIESLAK: I don't have a yes or no answer to that because I think I just heard John say that the amount he received might be more than the quarter he would have been entitled to anyway. So it may; it may. And as I'm sitting here, I'm thinking of other ways that the Commission might be able to fashion relief for this individual, which would require further discussion with the Division on my

part just to see if it's been done in the past.

But my thought was that I don't know when this subcommittee's recommendations will be coming up to the Retirement Commission, whether it will be this month or next month, because I know there's kind of a timetable that Colin and John put the agendas together. But presumably whenever that is, because we haven't even had Legal & Personnel yet this month. So the Retirement Commission meeting is not until the third Thursday.

It is likely that my office could have a legal opinion ready for the Retirement Commission meeting to consider along with the Subcommittee's recommendation if you wanted to go that route.

Whether it could be ready for Legal & Personnel next Wednesday, that might be a little bit more tight because I have other matters that we are working on for the Retirement Commission. But certainly, I think we could have something put together by the Retirement Commission meeting.

So it may resolve - what John Herrington mentioned may resolve the issues. We just - I don't have the factual details. But certainly, you know, this Subcommittee should proceed as they, you know, feel they can and consistent with their fiduciary

obligation.

MR. DISETTE: This is John Disette. If I'm hearing this, the fact that the paperwork got delayed for whatever reason, if the agency considered - or if the agency actually kept them on payroll because they couldn't process the paperwork in time, it is impossible for us to change the date backwards. Is that what we're trying to say here?

MR. HERRINGTON: Right, correct.

MR. DISETTE: That because he got paid-

MR. HERRINGTON: Right, right. The issue is that you can't simultaneously be employed and retired at the same time, setting aside for a second the TWR issue. But yes, that is the issue.

MR. DISETTE: It is the intent of that though to cover these situations where, for whatever reason, the paperwork didn't get done on time, or is that just a - what the general statute is trying to say, that you can't do both simultaneously, but we do have the discretion, when we see an error or we see some sort of faux pas in some way, that we can't correct it?

MR. HERRINGTON: I don't want to speak for Cindy, but, I mean, I would say that this appears to be an issue that we should be able to remedy. I think

the issue or the concern would be to the extent that we ignore this principle that would - and would apply probably with more force in future cases that we need to be careful in setting that precedent. And I think that we just want to - because I have these ideas that make sense to me. I haven't consulted a single source yet, and I think that it would be more prudent for us to think through this kind of thoroughly and have a defensible position that allows for that flexibility.

That's my position based on the concerns that Cindy has raised. I'll let Cindy address it beyond that.

MS. CIESLAK: This is Cindy Cieslak. I'm generally in agreement with John, also recognizing that I don't have the legal authority to back it up in front of me at the very moment. But I believe there is another matter that this - actually, I don't know if this subcommittee reviewed it, but the Retirement Commission reviewed it. It was a disability matter though where the retirement date got changed even though there were payouts to the individual. And we'd have to look back and see what happened with that individual's audit.

I'm wondering if this can be reconciled with an audit and, you know, somewhat considered an

overpayment. I don't know the legalities of that. I would also want to consult with the Commission's tax attorney regarding any issues surrounding plan disqualification to the extent that any - you know, this could impact this - impact plan disqualification, which I don't think it would, but I would want to confirm.

So, you know, I do believe it's possible that we might be able to get to a place where everything is consistent with law and still be able to give this individual relief, if that would be the trustees' desire.

MR. HERRINGTON: Right. And in terms of the delay, the further delay in the resolution, I do believe that what we're talking about here now, right, it wouldn't necessarily be felt by the individual until next July. There's an adjustment for the July retirement check, but that would be kind of offset slightly by whatever adjustment may be in order with respect to the sick leave.

So I certainly appreciate the fact that this individual has waited since July 1st to correct an issue that was of no fault of his own. But I do think that it's not as though there's going to be a life-altering relief that's going to be granted to him in

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the next month or three months. It really won't have
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     much impact to him at all until next July.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Bob Coffey?
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                MR. COFFEY: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
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     motion on the table-
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: You do.
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                MR. COFFEY: --to table this matter for
     referral to the Legal & Personnel Subcommittee.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you. Is there a
     second?
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                MR. CHISEM: I'll second it.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right, Carl Chisem.
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                MR. CHISEM: Sorry.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?
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     All in favor of the motion, say aye or raise your
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     hand.
                UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Aye.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Opposed, nay or raise
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     your hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It carried two-to-one.
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     Thank you.
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                MS. CIESLAK: Mr. Adomeit, this is Cindy
     Cieslak. I apologize for the interruption. When a
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     vote is not unanimous and we have the meeting being
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held virtually, a roll call vote is required for the
record.
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CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Oh, thank you very much.

Okay. So we will do a recall. Those of you who voted yes, please state your name.

MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey.

MR. CHISEM: Carl Chisem.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: And those who voted no, state your name.

MR. DISETTE: John DiSette.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you. Thank you, Cindy.

All right, moving on. Daniel O'Grady.

Colin Newman.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman. Thank you, Patty, for the last two cases.

Daniel O'Grady, this matter was tabled from the June 14th meeting. Essentially - I don't know if anybody remembers. So Judge O'Grady submitted an intent to retire effective April 1st of 2022, but unfortunately, he passed away on March 27th of this year. Pursuant to the Probate Provisions 45-39, if he were to pass away prior to April 1st, his surviving spouse would be eligible for a pre-retirement death benefit.

Part of the - the retirement packet that was sent to Mrs. O'Grady on March 29th included a retirement application reflecting that. In April, a claim came in from Mrs. O'Grady that the benefit be paid in accordance with her husband's expressed intent to retire with naming her as the hundred-percent contingent annuitant option. She provided - in her claim packet, she provided a CO 898 P application as well as a signed income payment election form. And it showed that this - well, she asserted that this paperwork was signed on March 25th.

The reason why it was tabled, because it was in question as to where that particular document came from, but after further review, talking with the Division staff, it appeared that it was the Retirement Division staff that had sent that initial - sent that packet to Mrs. O'Grady initially.

But in any event, the way the provisions are is that because Judge O'Grady passed away prior to April 1st of 2022, his spouse is eligible for a preretirement death benefit, and what they're asking is for the Commission to waive that based on the fact that he had made an intent to retire with electing the hundred-percent annuitant option.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, Colin. Bob

Coffey?

MR. COFFEY: Colin, you've included in the packet the precedence of the Commission with regard to the posthumous processing of applications for retirement.

MR. NEWMAN: Mm-hmm.

MR. COFFEY: As you look at those precedents and this case, do you think this case falls within the line of precedence that would approve this?

MR. NEWMAN: So each one of those preceding cases were decided upon their own individual merits.

It certainly - the Commission in the past has - basically, they've gone both ways on matters such as this. Certainly, when someone has shown like an intent to retire, you know, the Commission has granted - you know, has granted the appeal. But generally, it's always been on the specific facts of each individual case.

MR. COFFEY: Would this case not fall into a category of stronger cases in that we have an actual signed application from the retiree, and the signed option document for the hundred-percent option? In other cases, we found intent through, you know, affidavits from family members and that kind of stuff.

MR. NEWMAN: Right.

MR. COFFEY: But this is the actual application and form. Why would we not view this as a stronger case than many that you have listed on our packet?

MR. NEWMAN: I mean, we could - you could view it as a stronger case because - yes, because of the fact that the retiree actually signed the application.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah.

MR. NEWMAN: And you're correct, there have been like lesser forms of evidence that have been provided in other cases that the Commission has made a - has approved, you know, has approved, yeah, an application.

MR. COFFEY: I was wondering whether your concern here had something to do with the fact that the line of cases that we've looked at have been, you know, coming out of SERS, whereas the probate system is a somewhat different system, and I can't recall off the top of my head whether we've had a posthumous processing like this from the probate judges system.

But does that make any difference here?

MR. NEWMAN: I don't believe it makes any
difference. You know, regardless of the retirement
system, I believe, like I said, even though all of the

cases that are shown are SERS cases, each one was decided upon the particular merits of that particular case. It certainly does look in this case that there definitely was intent on Judge O'Grady's - you know, of Judge O'Grady in retiring. The only thing is that because the way the provisions are in the probate system, that the person actually has to retire - had to actually reach the retirement date in which - you know, in order for them to be retired.

this case, passed away prior to the retirement date, and as such, the way the provisions read, the person would be subject to the preretirement death benefit.

I might add there was another case on that June 14th meeting that was similar, but it was a SERS person where the application actually had not been completed, but the person - it was determined that the person had begun the process to show that they intended to retire, by like contacting the human resource office.

And the Commission ultimately approved that, basically looking at, you know, the evidence of the intent.

This case, there certainly is evidence of intent to retire. It's just a matter of like the language in the provisions, whether or not those could be waived due to the fact that intent was shown that

the person would have retired, and he just happened to 2 pass away three days before the end of the month.

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MR. COFFEY: Are you saying that there's language in the SERS statute?

MR. NEWMAN: No, in the probate statutes.

MR. COFFEY: No, no, no, no. My question is, are you saying there's language in the SERS statute that makes it easier for the Commission to approve posthumous processing, that that language doesn't seem to be in the probate statute, and that's the reason why I detect some hesitancy in your presentation?

In all honesty, I'm not sure of MR. NEWMAN: the language in the SERS statutes as to the reason why. You know, like I said, each case that has come before the Commission and when they determine that the individual - the ones that were approved because it was determined that the individual was making the intent to - you know, there was a strong case that the person intended to retire and they had completed the you know, that some of them, they had completed the paperwork, much like this, they had completed the paperwork including the option form in the application, and that the - certainly - well, let me go back.

So in SERS, if someone has completed the 1 2 application and if they - and they've elected like 3 option - the hundred-percent option, that individual and the application has arrived in the Division, you 4 know, the Division will honor that option for 90 days. 5 So if the person selects - chooses that the option -6 7 the paperwork has arrived in the Retirement Division, 8 and then the person who had subsequently passed away prior to the end of the month, the Division would 9 still honor the option choice that was selected by the 10 11 individual. MR. COFFEY: Okay. 12 MR. NEWMAN: The 90-day protection clause 13 essentially is what I'm talking about. 14 15 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Colin, what's the difference in pay between the preretirement, the death 16 benefit, and the benefit that - is what I was seeking. 17 MR. NEWMAN: That, I don't have in front of 18 19 me. 20 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. 21 MR. NEWMAN: No. I would have to get it. CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right. I take, it 22 23 it's more. MR. COFFEY: Would it not be-24 MR. NEWMAN: It would be-25

MR. COFFEY: --would it not be fifty percent as opposed to a hundred percent?

MR. HERRINGTON: Correct, correct. Right, it's almost double for the surviving spouse, correct. The actuarial factor would impact that somewhat, but, you know, for all intents and purposes, she would receive almost twice what she's receiving now.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right.

MR. COFFEY: In my view, we have the evidence of intent. We have a document signed by the employee saying - giving us an effective date. Not only saying that they intend to retire, but giving us the effective date when they retire, and a signed document showing that he selects the hundred percent contingent annuitant option. It seems to me that based on our precedents, we have sufficient evidence here to recommend to the Commission that it allow this posthumous processing of this retirement application.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Bob, do you want to condense that into a motion?

MR. COFFEY: I move that we approve Judge O'Grady's posthumous retirement application. I mean, I move that we recommend to the Commission that it approve Judge O'Grady's posthumous retirement application.

1 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.

MR. DISETTE: John DiSette. I'll second that.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right. Any further discussion? Hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise your hand.

(No audible response)

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It's unanimous. Thank you very much.

Moving on. It is Mallory or Malarry (phonetic) Perry.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman. Mallory Perry was hired as a fulltime faculty member at UCONN School of Nursing on August 23rd, 2022. Apparently, there was a CO9-31 that was completed, but was not sent to the Retirement Division because apparently Ms. Perry elected plan membership in the SERS hybrid plan. And the reason why it wasn't submitted is because it appears that UCONN human resources advised her that she was ineligible to be in that plan because she had been previously defaulted into the Alternate Retirement Program, the six-and-a-half percent option.

Ms. Perry appealed that. She is claiming that she wasn't given a complete retirement orientation, and that at the time when she was first

hired, like back in 2019, she was only given two options, either to waive retirement plan membership or select the ARP plan, which was because of the fact that, at that time, she was hired as an adjunct, was the appropriate plan options given to her.

Looking on her record, and if you notice like Exhibit D, there is a notice of retirement plan default that was on file with the Retirement Division, and it showed that - you know, that Ms. Perry was defaulted to the ARP plan due to the fact that she never responded to multiple requests from her HR office for her to complete the form back in 2019.

As everybody is aware, and, you know, looking at Exhibit B, retirement plan membership is required - the person is supposed to make an irrevocable election on their first day of hire. And so in her case, well, they tried to do that when they were hiring her as an adjunct in 2019. Apparently, she didn't respond to the request, and she was ultimately defaulted into the ARP plan. But, you know, we moved the claim before this subcommittee to see what would be recommended.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Peter Adomeit. Thank you, Colin.

Well, I can read the rule here. Let me do

so. To change - well, it says, all new hires state - education state employees were to make an irrevocable election to participate in an applicable retirement plan offered by the employer no later than their first day of hire.

Is that a speedbump or is that a roadblock?

MR. HERRINGTON: So, Colin, if we were going to assist this member and make the case, right, what she's really complaining about is the fact that she has no choice upon her reemployment because once she was placed into a plan, she must remain in that plan and she doesn't get a second choice.

MR. NEWMAN: Correct.

MR. HERRINGTON: And that, you know, had she acted upon her initial hire, if she had waived membership, that would have given her the option to select a plan when she was reemployed?

MR. NEWMAN: That's correct.

MR. HERRINGTON: All right. But the fact that she didn't respond to any of those inquiries from the employer at her initial hire, that's what resulted in her being defaulted—

MR. NEWMAN: Defaulted.

MR. HERRINGTON: --into the plan. As we talk through this issue, I'm just wondering, you know,

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to what extent it might be helpful for Bruce Barth to
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     kind of opine on the same-day election rule, or
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     whether we're all kind of fully versed in that because
     I believe that the application of that rule is going
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     to come up in a number of these other cases as well.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Would it be useful to the
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     Commission to have Bruce Barth look at this?
                MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey. I have no
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     objection to having him look at it. I'd be surprised
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     it he said anything that was any different than is in,
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     you know, the Division's memorandum.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Is there any
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     further discussion? Are you ready for a motion?
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                MR. COFFEY: This is Bob Coffey. I move
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     that we recommend to the Commission that it deny the
     request of Mallory Perry.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Thank you, Bob.
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     Is there a second?
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                MR. DISETTE: John DiSette. I'll second.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?
     Okay, hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise
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     your hand.
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                (No audible response)
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The ayes have it,
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     unanimous.
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Okay, moving on, Christine Spak.

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MR. NEWMAN: So this is Colin Newman again. This is another case that was tabled from the June $14^{
m th}$ meeting. At that meeting, Attorney Krzys on behalf of Ms. Spak was requesting that because of the fact that Ms. Spak had been granted Tier II retirement plan membership for her due to her period of personal service agreement time, which had begun prior to July 1 of 1997. The Commission stated the fact that she was eligible for Tier II membership. And then Attorney Krzys then asked the question, because Ms. Spak had been informed by her agency that she had some prior Tier I service and that they believed that she had eight years and 11 months, I believe it was, of prior Tier I service, and the fact that when she separated and came back she had less time in her period of separation than she actually worked, according to the agency, Attorney Krzys was stating that she should be granted Tier I membership.

The Division questioned the amount of time that the agency had indicated that she had in Tier I, and reviewing at the time when she did have Tier I membership, came up with a lesser period of time, essentially approximately five years and a month of time where she contributed to Tier I, therefore since

her period of separation was seven years and nine months, basically like denied the request and sent it to this body.

When it was being reviewed in Attorney
Krzys' presentation, he provided information of the
fact that Ms. Spak had like additional periods of
contractual service that she had not applied for, and
this period of service was between 1987 and 1993, the
Subcommittee at that time then recommended tabling the
matter to allow Attorney Krzys to provide the
additional documentation regarding like the PSA time,
and, you know, to allow him to complete the record to
allow this request to move forward.

September of this year, Attorney Krzys essentially submitted an amended revised claim for her retirement credit, you know, on behalf of Ms. Spak.

In addition to the request to transfer it from Tier II to Tier I, for that purpose, he was also requesting that she get approved for the series of PSA contracts that she had rendered service between July 1 of '87 and January 31st of 1993.

It's a little bit different because, in the past, and in the packet I show it, the Commission when determining to allow contractual service, it's usually the person performed the service and then transitioned

seamlessly directly into State service with like no breaks, and that would allow - and they were performing the same duties; they had the same reporting duties; nothing changed except for the fact they were now a State employee as opposed to a contractual employee. And in those cases where the Commission found that the transition was seamless, those cases were granted.

In this case, what is being asked, and I'm sure Attorney Krzys can expand on this, is the fact that this individual was in State service and is now asking for contractual service that was done after she had terminated from State service, for that inclusion, because that would allow her to bridge that permanent break rule, so to speak.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Thank you, Colin.
Attorney Krzys, you have the floor.

MR. KRZYS: This is Robert Krzys. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. Good afternoon to
Commission counsel, Commission staff and trustees.

Colin is right; this is a hybrid claim in the sense that it is seeking added Tier I service for three periods of time that Christine Spak worked at the University of Connecticut when she was first starting her professional career and for permanent e

employment thereafter with the Department of Health, a period of approximately four years. So the first part of the claim is to ask for crediting of all of that Tier I service, and I'll talk about that a little more soon.

The second part of the hybrid plan is her personal service agreement time from 1987 to 1993 with the Department of Public Health. And when we adjourned, we did provide the personal services agreements that Christine Spak had retained in her own files, the Department not being able to produce them. But it shows that she was employed under a personal services agreement from 1987 to 1993. And her affidavit and the affidavit of her two supervisors speak to the similarity of the duties.

claim. Christine Spak was granted a significant amount of personal service time by the subcommittee and then subsequently the Commission, which established her now initial retirement date of July 19th, '93. That placed her in Tier II. When she subsequently applied to retire from State service, which she did on July 1st, 2022, she had received from her human resources department a listing of all of her State service, which showed all of that prior UCONN

time and those four years with the Department of
Public Health as well as her personal services
agreement time, which led to the filing of this nowrevised plan.

So the UCONN time is in three separate periods. The issue with the UCONN time is that Mr.

Newman provided us with a 25-page document, which showed that for the first and third periods of her UCONN service, employee contributions were not collected, but for the second period of time, employee contributions were selected (sic). Interesting enough, for all three periods of time, employer contributions were taken from her paychecks. It is on that basis that we seek all of the UCONN time, all three periods, and that she be allowed to restore any missing contributions so that the time would be appropriate.

As to the Department of Public Health permanent employment, she worked for the Department of Public Health because she was hired into a fulltime position in September of 1982, and she worked until April of 1986 as a permanent employee setting up a hearing office under the medical quality assurance unit. Her supervisors have filed affidavits, Steven Herriman (phonetic) and Stanley Peck (phonetic),

bureau chiefs, attesting to what she did there. Her affidavit states that she left State service to go into private practice; she's an attorney; but that shortly after she left permanent employment, she was recruited by Mr. Herriman to come back. And in his affidavit, he says he resorted to a personal services agreement because there was no ability of him to act quickly through the Office of Policy and Management to authorize the position, so he hired her back.

She worked there in that same position, came right back to her desk, right back to the building, right back to the same duties, and performed them from 1987 to 1993. When she left, the records provided with Mr. Newman said that she was refunded those contributions that she made as a permanent employee from '82 to '86. Again, we asked that she be allowed to restore those contributions so that time would count, and we would ask that she be granted her personal services time from '87 to '93 because she did the same job, and she was recruited by the Department to come back and do it.

Now, Mr. Newman is accurate in stating that in these cases, these personal services agreements that then morph into permanent employment, it usually goes contractual time first, PSA time first, and then

a hire into permanent employment. However, there is no real distinction between crediting personal service time, in our estimation, that follows permanent employment, because that would stand on its head the idea that one can be hired by the State in a personal services agreement to do the same job and not be entitled to that time just because it followed rather than preceded permanent employment.

I don't think you can read the provisions that are contained in the SEBAC agreement - I believe it's SEBAC 5 - regarding personal service agreements and other agreements to preclude the purchase or the granting of time that follows permanent employment.

So we have a case where an employee went through the system, was granted time that established a new hire date. When she went to retire last year, she was informed that she had previous Tier I time and previous PSA time, which she had not pursued because the break in service rule was there. She was obviously gone while she was pursuing her Department of Education time longer than she was hired, but the email showed that the gap had closed. And so it was, in our view, appropriate to pursue the purchase of all of the time, the Tier I time, and the personal service time.

And so I'd be happy to clarify any of the arguments that I've put forth today or answer any questions that may occur. And I've also asked the applicant to attend this meeting and be on mute just in case I am bereft of a fact that may be important and she may be able to help us on.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, Attorney Krzys.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman. Just a couple things. So SERS is actuarially funded, so there wouldn't be any contributions, employer contributions, reflected in the individual's paycheck. It would show what they made as a - depending on their plan membership, the contribution amount that they - that was taken from them.

In the event that she was allowed to do a restoration of refund for her refunded amounts, it would only be for the periods of time that she actually contributed for. There were other periods of time that she may have been in a position that was ineligible for plan membership as to the reason why there weren't any contributions taken from her.

So if anything, it would bring her back to where she was as of 1986, you know, because basically it was the UCONN - the periods of time at UCONN when

she wasn't in an eligible position that she had contributions coming, out and the Department of Health, which are the - I think are reflected under the agency, ER, when she was in a position that was eligible for retirement with health.

The other thing is that even if, looking at

- if not just leaving it to the fact that the PSA time

was after a period of time of State employment is not

- I'm sorry - is not just limiting it and saying that

- or we would look at the PSA time if State employment

followed it. One of the provisions for approval of

PSA time is that it has to be a seamless transition.

But now, yes, there have been cases where it's been determined there was an extenuating circumstance as to the reason why there may have been a gap between the PSA time and the time that the person actually started State employment. And it was usually for like a minimal amount of time. In this case, they're looking to ask to be approved for PSA time that commenced at least over a year after she had left State service in 1986.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Attorney Krzys.

MR. KRZYS: So the Tier I time back at UCONN, she made contributions for period number two, and it doesn't show any contributions for period

number one and number three. And I'll bring up colin's statement that, yeah, SERS is funded by the employer on an actuarial basis doesn't necessarily mean one and three shouldn't count, but, you know, it's an issue.

In terms of the PSA time and when it is, the interesting thing about it is when you look at the PSA documents that she submitted, they start on 7/1/87, which is why I referred to 7/1/87. But as pointed out in her affidavit — or in the argument that I filed, when you look at that first personnel service agreement, it says — the box amendment is checked. The box original is not checked. And so the contractor agrees to an increase in the dollar amount. It's obvious that she was working before 7/1/87 under a personal services agreement because this is an amendment; it's not an original agreement.

The problem is that the agency doesn't have any of the personal services agreements. We know there has to be one prior to July 1st, 1987; we just can't dig it up. And so if you look at the affidavit of Ewen Hammerman (phonetic), the man who recruited her back into the agency, he says, shortly thereafter - Stanley Peck was also there, so he says, shortly thereafter. And Christine says, it was a little

while, and I came back because they recruited me. But we do not know the period of time, but it is certainly not from April 1986 to July 1st, 1987. It just can't be, because her first personal service agreement that we do have that she did maintain is an amendment to a preexisting one.

So the idea that it has to be seamless is also sort of a concept that has been applied as these cases have evolved. And if there is a reason for the delay in coming back, it should be looked at. So we've approved cases in the past where the gap has been two months, one day, the length of a summer vacation. And in this case, all we know is that it's an indeterminate amount of time, and that the State officials brought her back. And I would submit that that is a somewhat extenuating circumstance to make the connection and the nexus between her permanent employment in '86 and her coming back under a PSA sometime prior to July 1st, 1987.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. Thank you, Attorney Krzys.

MR. COFFEY: Bob Coffey. I'd like to ask

Attorney Krzys if he could fill us in a little bit

about the circumstances involved in Ms. Spak leaving

State service in 1986. Was that a layoff; was that a

resignation? What happened?

MR. KRZYS: She went to pursue a position in the private sector for the private practice of law. So it would be a resignation.

MR. COFFEY: Okay. Okay. But you're saying that fairly soon after that, she was hired back to the same or a similar job under PSA?

MR. KRZYS: Yes. She was hired back. She ended her employment with the medical assurance unit on April 10th, 1986 to take a position with a private firm. That's in her affidavit. Subsequent to that, she says, I was contacted by Harriman and brought back; she doesn't have the exact date, neither does Harriman and neither does Stanley Peck, both of whom were there and both of whom were aware that they had reached out because they needed her back.

She had established this medical quality assurance unit, which reviews the license revocations, the license approvals for a variety of health providers in the State. And they needed her back to run the unit because they were constantly adding providers, constantly having fair hearings about revocations and amendments and discipline, and they said, we need you back, and she came back.

But we don't have the precise timeline. We

1 just don't have it.

MR. COFFEY: Okay. If you're saying that they needed her back, do you know why they wouldn't have posted an opportunity to fill a permanent position?

MR. KRZYS: I don't know why Harriman did that. I would say that his affidavit says, I reached out to her because I knew she could do the work in this highly regulated and complex area without further training or orientation due to her most recent experience in our agency. I did this through a series of PSA's because at the time, the health regulatory areas were continuing to expand, and we had a need to satisfy our statutory and regulatory obligations, and the PSA route was more expedient than seeking OPM approval for a position.

So I guess his motivation was just to get it done and he knew she could do it.

MR. COFFEY: so his motivation was to just hire her in particular and not have to go through any real hiring process?

MR. KRZYS: Must have been. That's what he says. She did the job for him for four years. She left. Who knows what was happening, but he was motivated to call her up and say, come back.

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                MR. COFFEY: Okay. Thanks.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you both.
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                Any further comments or questions?
                MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman. I just
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     want to know, on that contract, that amendment, it was
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     signed in February of '88?
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                MR. KRZYS: Yes, it was.
                MR. NEWMAN: Yeah.
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                MR. KRZYS: That's what it says.
                MR. NEWMAN: All right. And the subsequent
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     contracts, they all - the next two are checked off as
     amendments also?
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                MR. KRZYS: Yes, they would - yeah, they
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     would properly all be amendments, except that I will
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     note to you there is a box that's checked original in
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     the 1990 to '91.
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                MR. NEWMAN: Right.
                MR. KRZYS: I don't know why that is since
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     it was one right after another.
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                MR. NEWMAN: (Inaudible)
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                MR. KRZYS: And there was another one in
     '91, '92 is checked as original. I don't know why
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     that would be. And the next one is an amendment.
                MR. NEWMAN: Hmm.
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                MR. HERRINGTON: This is John Herrington.
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1 just have another timeline question. So we do have 2 Attorney Spak on the line. 3 Attorney Spak, do you have any personal knowledge of how long you were employed in private 4 practice at a private firm? 5 MS. SPAK: I'm unmuting. Did that work? 6 Can you hear me? 7 MR. HERRINGTON: Yes. 8 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: We can indeed. 10 MS. SPAK: Okay. Yeah. 11 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Go ahead. MS. SPAK: I know it was a very short period 12 of time because I was very happy to get his call. I -13 I - and I know, as I told Bob that it was warm. It 14 15 was, you know, warm out. But warm out, I know can mean anything other than probably December to March 16 around here. 17 So, you know, I mean, I don't want to 18 19 testify that I, you know, have the exact date. I've 20 kind of torn my home apart looking for that original contract. But I know it wasn't the year gap. So I 21

I would like to speak to the signing of it in '88, which I actually hadn't remembered, but I could tell you this. Signing of contracts varied over

know that I - it started.

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the many years that I did them. And there were periods not at issue here where we were told - the other work that I did when I worked for the education department, that we were told to keep working, and the contract, you know, from July 1st on and the contracts weren't signed until January one year. And I remember that because, you know, there was great discussion among the people doing it as to, you know, when would we actually get our contracts.

So it really depended on the personnel in the department that was processing the contracts, and sometimes they were well staffed and sometimes they weren't. So, you know, that's, I think, what that was about.

It wasn't anything to do with, you know, like negotiating or anything like that. It was just processing time.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.

MR. HERRINGTON: This is John Herrington. I was wondering if either Attorney Spak or Attorney Krzys could kind of walk me through the issue. So to the extent that the general rule would be that in awarding credit for PSA time that there be a seamless transition, I believe that I heard Attorney Krzys state that here there were extenuating circumstances

extenuating circumstances that we have some indication that the gap may or may not have been that long, but that we don't have evidence to establish how long that gap actually was, or were there other extenuating circumstances?

MR. KRZYS: Well, I would say-

MS. SPAK: Well, I mean, I don't - oh, go ahead.

MR. KRZYS: Go ahead, Christine, if you can speak-

MS. SPAK: No, well, I mean, I'm not sure exactly what the question is, but I know it wasn't over a year. So I know that that first contract was not the first contract. So, I mean, I could tell you, I absolutely know that.

And, you know, getting the follow up, the affidavits, what Stan and Steve's memory was that it was like I wasn't gone because I was back in the same parking place; I was at the, you know, copy machine copying things. And, you know, I have some memory of people, not people that signed affidavits, but at the time coming to me, you know, and asking if I had been on a vacation, you know, like where was I; where had I - or, you know, that kind of thing, just being

friendly, people that I had worked with, secretaries and such.

So I know it wasn't very long, but I can't say exactly when.

MR. KRZYS: John, let me-

MR. HERRINGTON: All right, just so we - yeah, go ahead, Attorney Krzys.

MR. KRZYS: Yeah, let me respond to that because I used the word extenuating and I want to just talk to you about what I meant by that. So that in the other cases that we've had, where the break, the time between the PSA and the permanent employment wasn't day-to-day; you left on a Thursday, you started on a Friday, because everybody starts on a Friday in State service.

MR. HERRINGTON: Right.

MR. KRZYS: So there were times when people had been on PSA's that said, hey, look, I've got to take a vacation, and then they came back two weeks later, or a month later. And the prior decisions are, well, that's okay. You know, that's when they - you went to the person and your hiring person said, okay, come on back then; I agree with that.

I was using the word extenuating in the sense that Christine Spak left, but the extenuating

circumstance that I'm referring to is not necessarily the period of time. It's that she was recruited back, that there has to be some recognition, I think, that she left, and they realized that they needed someone to come back and keep the place, the quality assurance unit, running, because she had not only established it; she was essentially supervising it.

So to me, that's an extenuating circumstance. It was a luring back. So I wasn't particularly talking about the period of time, because we apparently may never be able to know that, any of us, because we can't find the document.

 $\label{eq:MR.HERRINGTON: Okay, yeah, thank you.} % \begin{center} \begin{center} MR. HERRINGTON: Okay, yeah, thank you. \\ \begin{center} \b$

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman again.

Just a question on the contract. Could it be that the initial contract was signed for \$14,476; and the fact of the matter is, when it came around to February, it was determined that there basically wasn't enough moneys that were allocated to the contract to cover like the more formal hearings that were scheduled?

And so the additional - and as I'm reading it, it says, these additional fiscal resources are needed to cover the projected formal hearing case load through the end of this contract period, June 30th of 1988.

So is it possible that it could be that in February, it was realized that it wasn't enough money in the contract and that's the reason why it was increased?

MR. KRZYS: I don't know, Colin. I mean, I can't interpret the document and the intent between raising the money. Because a lot of these PSA's that were submitted raised the moneys from time to time.

So I don't know the answer to that. I supposed it is possible to read it that way. I'm not, you know, acquiescing to that. But it seems to me that when the affidavits say that she returned shortly thereafter, shortly thereafter doesn't mean from April 1986 to July 1987. That's not the recollection of the two hiring authorities and it's not the recollection of the applicant.

MR. COFFEY: This is Bob Coffey. I think, in order to come to a conclusion on this matter, we need to take a look at the history of our development of the line of cases dealing with PSA's. And I hate always to be the one to say that we have to look at history because it makes me feel even older than I am.

But the fact of the matter is that this line of cases started at a time when the State of Connecticut had a practice of keeping vacancies open,

not filling permanent vacancies, but trying to get and while trying to get the job done by hiring people
through PSA's. And as the financial fortunes of the
State improved, and permanent positions came open, the
appointing authorities would look to the people who
they had hired under these PSA's and offer them
permanent positions in the jobs.

And they'd continued working. The whole idea of this seamless transition from the PSA, they'd be doing the same basic work, there probably wouldn't even be a day or two off between the PSA and the permanent employment, and they would go on to work for long periods of time right up until retirement. And the Commission felt, when it started to look at these cases, that it was really the doing of the State to have these people in PSA's for the first two or three years that they were actually working, and that had they been doing things the way they should have, they would have hired these people from the outset and they would have been entitled to retirement.

They were getting the benefit of having these people on PSA's without giving them retirement credit, and in many cases paying them similar amounts to what they got paid as permanent employees, not even making up anything for the retirement. So that's the

underlying basis for why the Commission developed this line of cases.

Bob, let me finish and I'm going to-

MR. KRZYS: Oh, I'm not - I'm going to let you finish.

MR. COFFEY: Oh, I'm sure you want to respond.

MR. KRZYS: Mm-hmm.

MR. COFFEY: But just looking at this case, it doesn't fall into that line of cases at all. What we're being asked to do here is take a look at a situation whether it's arguably seamless or not from the time of permanent employment into the PSA's, that's not the determining factor for me. What's the determining factor for me is that this is not what happened in all those other cases, the State using the employees and then hiring them. This is a case where an employee was hired, was given retirement credit, decided to resign, was given retirement contributions back, and then was picked up on a PSA because the hiring authority needed that person back.

It's an entirely different situation in my view than hiring somebody and then bringing them along, you know, to a retirement position. It's not what the PSA line of cases that we have was intended

to accomplish.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Attorney Krzys, you had your hand up.

MR. KRZYS: Yeah. I'm just going to stick a little bit to history. I have a lot of history too. I can remember when I started out, negotiating my first collective bargaining agreement with the judicial department and some guy on the other side of the table was named Robert Coffey. So that's how far back we all go.

MR. COFFEY: Decades, Bob, decades.

MR. KRZYS: Yeah, millenniums.

MR. DISETTE: True.

MR. KRZYS: When you - and I agree that the history is important, of what the heck are we doing granting time for personal service agreements or other agreements. Because if you look at the actual provision how this came about, it wasn't necessarily the action of the Retirement Commission. When this doctrine first came about, the first set of cases came about where some Pratt Whitney engineers had been laid off and were working for DAS as engineers under personal services agreements and they brought a case and they were granted.

Once they were granted, other people started

coming forward and said, hey, I've been on a PSA for quite a while and, you know, why can't I get retirement credit? So there was a line of claims marching up to the Retirement Commission, however it wasn't until the SEBAC agreement occurred in SEBAC 5 where the actual provision of personal service agreements and so-called other agreements, you could get it. So if you were working for a RES, a regional education service unit, we've had people get that time credited too.

So in addition, history is important because it wasn't so much that the State was using this as a gateway to permanent employment. The State was using it as a way to hire someone for lesser money, not pay them retirement credit, not pay them health insurance, and save money. So for instance, it just happens to be the case that Christine Spak in time that already has been granted to her by the Commission was on a personal service agreement from July 19th, 1993 to August 23rd, 2007, 14 years under a PSA, and then transitioned into permanent employment.

So it's all over the lot. The idea that it has to be immediate and seamless is really a doctrine that's been set up by this subcommittee. They've set it up, just like they've said, well, what's the

difference in salary. And so if you were working under a PSA and your salary under your PSA was let's say 15 percent over and above what you were hired for as a permanent State employee, this subcommittee would say, you're not going to be granted because that 15 percent was a recognition that we weren't paying you retirement, we weren't paying you health insurance. And so there was that little right line rule that came about when, you know, people like Linda Yamena (phonetic) and the late Charlie Kasala (phonetic) were on this committee. They had to draw some actions.

that has been utilized by the State. And what the Commission is about is addressing those circumstances where the device has been used and, in a sense, not really fairly with respect to the employee. And that's what I was trying to articulate when Mr. Herrington asked me that question about extenuating circumstances that they brought her back. You know, she was perfectly willing to come back because, as we all know, being in the private sector in a practice of law ain't that great.

And so those - you know, that's how I would respond. I don't reject the idea that we should understand the history, but I think the history of the

usage of PSA's and the addressing of PSA's by the

Commission and then by the collective bargaining is a

pretty complex history. It's not cut and dry.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, Attorney

Krzys.

There are five points, Attorney Krzys, to

There are five points, Attorney Krzys, to
the remedy that you are seeking for the Commission or rather, the Subcommittee, I mean. And maybe it
would be useful to go to that document and then look
at each one individually in recognition of the
complexity of this particular matter. It's your Page
7.

MR. KRZYS: Sure. So the first one, if you want me to just talk to them.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: What's that?

MR. KRZYS: Do you want me to just speak to them?

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah.

MR. KRZYS: And so the remedy requested, as the Chairman has pointed out, is a five-part request. And so that the first part of the request is the Tier I issue with respect to UCONN. And so you see those three discreet dates of '73 to '75, and '77 to '79, and '81 to '82 with UCONN where she made employee contributions in the second tenure, but not in the

first and the third.

Now, if she was allowed to make contributions in one, then it would seem that if it's Tier I service, then she should be at least allowed to buy back that period in which she made contributions. Why she wasn't debited contributions in period one and three, we don't know. Maybe it's perhaps, as Mr. Newman has said, it wasn't work in a classification that was in a pension plan at the time which had to be Tier I. Maybe that's the case.

Number two, it's Tier I in the Department of Public Health from '82 to '86. That was permanent employment. She had all - she made her contributions. And when she left, they were refunded to her. Doesn't seem to be any reason - we've allowed other people to re-do and make the contributions, and once the time is looked at as credible service, to restore the service. That seems to be a pretty solid request.

Now, the time from '87 to '83 is the time the thing that we've spent the most time talking
about. Mr. Herrington - Attorney Herrington has asked
questions about it. Attorney Coffey has probed about
it. And we simply have a somewhat - and Colin has
talked about, well, maybe the '87 to '88, the first
one, was an amendment just as to money. We don't know

because we don't have that one. What we do know is that the people involved, the applicant and the two supervisors say, it certainly wasn't a break from 1986 in April to July in 1987.

So assuming that a review of the documents shows that she did the same thing in the same manner, the issue to be grappled with is what is the - what do we have in front of us as to the length of the break and the reason for the break. And I just can't come much closer to an answer to the length of the break because I can't find the documents. I can only rely on the affidavits.

Number four is really dependent upon, quite frankly, I think, what happens to remedy two and three because if remedy two and three are granted, then the time that she left would be shorter than the time that she worked, so that the rule that you can't go back and grab time if you were gone longer than you were here would not prevent her from adding to her pension.

And then number five would just simply follow because if she was granted time under the PSA and under the permanent employment from '82 to '86, it would have to be in Tier I because her hire date would be changed, and there - we've done that in several cases. And the only one that comes to mind is the

case of William Congero (phonetic), who also happened to be a Department of Education employee, who applied for personal service time and moved his credited service once he was approved for the time right past. Tier I eligibility and he was allowed to make the proper retroactive contributions a Tier I person would have made and retired as a member of Tier I.

may not be that crucial, but what the disposition of two and three is is crucial because it goes to that period that Colin talked about, if you're gone longer than you were here, then you're not allowed to add the time. So that's why we're seeking the PSA time and the Tier I time, and most importantly, the Tier I '82 to '86 time.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you. Thank you. How do you wish to proceed?

MR. KRZYS: I assume you're not addressing me, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: No. I suspect I know what that answer would be.

MR. COFFEY: I don't know. I still can't get over the hump of the exception that Attorney Krzys is asking us to make to our treatment of these PSA cases. And I guess I think the entire matter of the

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     amended complaint - or the amended request, you know,
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     really rises and falls on that issue.
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                As I recall, we have looked at this matter
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     before and granted relief that was requested
     previously. I just - because of what I said about how
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     I believe our precedents have operated, I can't go
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     along with the argument here.
                That being said, I'll move that we deny this
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     request.
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                MR. DISETTE: John DiSette, I'll second
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11
     that.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Is there any further
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     discussion? Okay, hearing none, all in favor of the
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     motion, raise your hand or say aye.
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15
                (No audible response)
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It's unanimous.
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                All right. Thank you very much. Thank you,
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     Attorney Krzys.
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                All set. So we can move on to James
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     Vasquez. Mr. Newman?
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                MR. NEWMAN: I apologize. I put it on mute
     because I didn't want my dogs to start barking right
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     in the middle of it. This is Colin.
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James Vasquez was hired as a chief

information officer for the Connecticut State Colleges

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and Universities effective July 2nd, 2021. Pursuant to the collective bargaining process, at the time of his hire, if a retirement plan wasn't elected on the first day of employment, an unclassified non-union employee within the higher education system would be defaulted to the SERS Tier IV hybrid plan.

On February 9th of this year, the Director of Shared Services and Business Transformations for Central - for the Connecticut State Colleges and Universities advises Division that Mr. Vasquez had actually signed his CO-931 enrollment form on July 13th, 2021, eleven days after his date of hire. The director was asking as to whether or not Mr. Vasquez could enroll in his elected choice, which was the Alternate Retirement Program with the six-and-a-half percent option contribution rate, or should he be defaulted into the Tier IV hybrid plan.

The Division advised that he should be defaulted. However, the records showed that he hasn't been enrolled in either plan. In March of this year, Mr. Vasquez appealed that administrative decision by the Division. He stated that he was instructed that he had to return all his necessary documents within 30 days of his hire. You know, he is claiming that, you know, agency error caused him not to enroll in ARP.

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1 We brought this matter forward to the Subcommittee.
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- 2 There was like an email chain that I had sent to the
- 3 | Subcommittee late yesterday afternoon indicating
- 4 information that was provided by his agency to the
- 5 Division.
- And I believe Mr. Vasquez is on the Zoom
- 7 call.
- 8 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: He is.
- 9 MR. VASQUEZ: That's correct.
- 10 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Go ahead. You have the
- 11 floor.
- MR. VASQUEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The
- description of the case is accurate. The advisement
- of the agency was to reply with the appropriate
- 15 paperwork within 30 days of employment. I
- 16 accomplished that. There wasn't an alert or a warning
- 17 that certain paperwork had to be done on the first day
- 18 of employment. So therefore, it did not occur.
- 19 This was the selection of the Alternate
- 20 | Retirement Program was and has been in previous
- 21 | employment opportunities in other states usually my
- 22 | chosen option. And it was just an administrative
- 23 error. It also impacted the collection of leave
- 24 balances, which is not under this committee's purview,
- 25 but further indicates that an administrative error had

occurred during the hiring process.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay, thank you.

Does anybody have any comments? Mr. Lopez?

MR. LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, if I could

possibly comment, would that be appropriate at this

6 point on behalf of Mr. Vasquez?

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah. Are you an attorney too?

MR. LOPEZ: No, sir. My name is Mike Lopez.

I'm the director of HR administration for Connecticut

State Colleges and Universities.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. All right, you have the floor.

MR. LOPEZ: Wonderful, thank you. And my sincere thanks to the Commission as well to hear our case. And as Mr. Vasquez said, I believe and I can certainly attest that at that point in time, we were still working through a major transition into a shared services framework for both HR and payroll here for the Connecticut State Colleges and Universities.

So we were going through significant transformation. We were revamping our onboarding process as one of many workflows that we were trying to enhance and develop additional efficiencies, whether it was through Zoom calls and open webinars

with larger groups of our employees, et cetera. And we do believe that during the onboarding process with Mr. Vasquez, that there was some miscommunication by the agency in regards to the requirement to have that form signed and a decision made on or before the first day of employment, which again, for Mr. Vasquez, was the 2nd of July of '21.

So I believe the onboarding information was provided, but in regards to that date, it just simply was not properly clarified on the part of the agency with Mr. Vasquez. And that, with all of the other onboarding documents that were presented to him at the same time, we were developing an online portal to complete and upload these onboarding documents in one onboarding packet. So I think lent itself to some additional confusion at the time, and I certainly advocate for this requested enrollment in ARP IV for Mr. Vasquez based on agency error.

Again, we were working through a lot of changes, and in fact, we're two years into the process and we're still going through some enhancements to our workflows and how to better serve our customers, and this was just an unfortunate miss on our part. So I certainly would greatly appreciate the Commission's consideration on that.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.

MR. HERRINGTON: This is John Herrington.

And I appreciate that summary, Mike. The one issue that I would have is we requested a similar statement corroborating Mr. Vasquez' claim back in May, and what we received was nowhere near as robust as kind of the response that you just provided now. We received a response for Laura Yuwell (phonetic) that was kind of equivocal in terms of what was communicated regarding the 30 days.

So can you kind of explain kind of how the agencies' position has kind of been a bit clarified from May of this until today?

MR. LOPEZ: Sure, John. I'd be happy to.

First off, just to sort of set the organizational construct a bit for the Commission, Laura Yuwell is our director of payroll shared services. So her role in regards to the actual onboarding process with Mr.

Vasquez is - or was extremely limited at the time.

The onboarding process that we're talking about today really fell almost solely to the HR shared services side of the house, which involves me and my team, as well as our HR strategy team with the onboarding process, again, both independent of payroll shared services.

So, you know, I do apologize if there was sort of any miscommunication or less emphasis than I think this claim deserves. But again, it may have all to do with the fact that, you know, payroll at the time, and even to this date, is at least at that point in the onboarding process, their role has essentially not commenced yet, if you will. It starts with HR with the hiring and the processing and tour with the actual interaction with the new employee, with going over the onboarding documents and answering any questions the employee has, explaining to them the requirement to make that retirement plan election on or before the date of their employment.

So again, all of that lands on the HR shared services side of the house. And that conversation regarding when to sign that form and when that decision needs to be made rests with us. So I think that's the best explanation I can give on that, John. I apologize for any sort of confusion between my comments and what you may have received.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.

MR. HERRINGTON: Just to kind of follow up on this, right. One issue would be allowing us to honor that election, then the next issue would be what our remedies are in terms of resolving it

retroactively to the date of hire, considering that it covers two different tax years. But the one point that I would make is that the request that Agnes of our Division made, she made that request both to you, Mike, and Laura, and Laura responded. I would say that to the extent that we had received as robust a response back in May where the agency was clearly taking responsibility for misinforming Mr. Vasquez, I think that this might have been able to be - we might have been able to resolve this without coming to the Commission.

MR. LOPEZ: Yeah, I appreciate that, John.

MR. HERRINGTON: Yeah, okay.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, John.

MR. DISETTE: John DiSette. John, when you say, resolve this without having to come to the Commission, how would you have resolved it?

MR. HERRINGTON: Right. I mean, to the extent that there is a clear agency error where the agency is taking responsibility and alerting us that they did not inform the member of the same-day election rule, and the person is being faulted through no fault of their own, we would have resolved it.

We still would have had the issue to resolve in terms of whether we would resolve that when it came

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     to our attention in February, or whether it would go
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     all the way back to the initial date of hire.
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     something that we likely would need to involve the
     Commission's tax counsel for that resolution. But to
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     the extent that the agency clearly takes
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     responsibility for an error such as this, we would
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     resolve that in the employee's favor.
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                MR. DISETTE: In this case, that would be
     the ARP?
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                MR. HERRINGTON: Correct.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay. How does the
     Commission wish to proceed?
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                MR. COFFEY: This is Bob Coffey. I would
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     move that we recommend to the Commission that it
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     approve the Vasquez request based on information about
     agency error.
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                MR. DISETTE: John DiSette. I'll second.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?
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     Hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise your
     hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It's unanimous. The ayes
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     have it.
               Thank you very much.
                MR. LOPEZ: Wonderful. Thank you
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     (inaudible).
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1 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, gentlemen, for coming.

MR. LOPEZ: Greatly appreciate your help. Thank you.

MR. VASQUEZ: Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: The next case is Robert Verno.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman. Robert

Verno retired 25 years ago as a State trooper - I'm

sorry, as a State Trooper First Class from - as part

of the public safety. At the time, as a hazardous

duty member, and because of the fact that this was

during the time of an early retirement incentive

program, he was given - eventually he was given three

additional years of service to his time. So he

basically received a benefit based on 30 years of

hazardous duty credited service, which essentially was

70 percent of his salary.

In August of '21, Mr. Verno wrote to the Division regarding his option election that he had made at the time. He did elect the straight life annuity option, and he's saying that he did this based upon the potential loss of benefits that could occur for somebody that did not take advantage of the incentive program, even though as of the date of his

retirement, the incentive actually had not been approved through the legislature.

It subsequently was, and because he actually - his benefit actually was adjusted in December of '97. But going back to his claim, he basically was saying that he didn't receive any assistance from his agency because they wouldn't advise him as to which - sorry. Okay.

Yeah, he didn't receive any advice from his agency as to which spousal option to take. And he's saying that because of this and the fact that, you know, the incentive hadn't been approved, he was unable to make an informative decision.

I will just make a comment that the individual that signed off on his retirement application actually was an individual that worked in the Retirement Division, was a counsellor in the Retirement Division before she went to State police. So she was well-versed in retirement.

The Division responded in December of '21.

It administratively denied his request stating that the Division didn't have the authority to change his option election. And the fact of the matter is, the SERS plan provisions, they do specify that any income payment election is an irrevocable choice and must be

made before the commencement of the pension.

When executing his paperwork and signing off on his option, the straight life annuity option, he was acknowledging that he understood that no option election could be made like after retirement.

Further, his spouse did sign off on the spouse waiver form on the spouse waiver of the survivor benefit, basically acknowledging that she understood the effects of her husband's option election, including the health insurance coverage consequences. The Division did advise that we were going to forward his matter before the Retirement Commission's subcommittee.

Tust to comment further, at that time, once the incentive had gone through, the Retirement

Division offered a number of workshops and advised the agencies as such, you know, by memorandum June 9th of 1997, and basically for a month, offered workshops, and it was done on an individualized basis with respect to the plan that you were in. You know, they did a workshop for Tier I, Plan B; they did a workshop for Tier II; they did a workshop for hazardous duty members. And agencies were advised that they could invite even like more recently retired employees, you know, to the workshops if they were looking for like

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2 Unfortunately, I did reach out to the State 3 Police just to see if they had any documentation 4 indicating that Mr. Verno had attended the workshop, but they have not got back to me by the time of this 5 meeting. Additionally, and the reason I asked is 6 7 because when the incentive in 1992 was offered, he 8 actually did attend a workshop at that time. Secondly, I believe he was versed in the retirement 9 10 process because he actually was going to retire 11 effective June 1 of 1995, and had actually gone 12 through and signed all his retirement paperwork, however he did subsequently rescind the retirement and 13 14 return to State employment.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Okay, thank you, Colin. (Inaudible) has the floor.

MR. HERRINGTON: This is John Herrington.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: John Herrington, go

ahead.

MR. HERRINGTON: Not that this makes a huge difference, but one thing to note is that because he is a Tier I State police officer, he has an independent spousal option, or a State police survivor option that compensates for the lack of social security, and it was not uncommon among Tier I State

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     police officers to rely on the State police survivor
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     option to provide the protection to the spouse.
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     dollar amount is relatively modest, but it does
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     provide the lifetime health insurance.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, John.
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                MR. DISETTE: Am I missing something here?
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     Because this seems obvious. No? He's been collecting
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     for 25 years now?
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                MR. NEWMAN: Yes. Since (inaudible)
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     retirement, yes.
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                MR. DISETTE: So and he's - if - see if I
     did my math right. He's about 73, his wife is 72, and
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     they're looking to change the full spousal option at
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     this point and claiming he was never informed and had
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     no idea but signed the waiver anyway?
                MR. HERRINGTON: Correct.
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                MR. NEWMAN: And I don't think we even
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     addressed the fact that if he was allowed to do that,
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     he'd have a significant overpayment.
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                MR. DISETTE:
                             Right.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yeah.
                MR. DISETTE: Right, he couldn't afford it
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     if you gave it to him; could he?
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: No. No. Is that a
24
     motion, Mr. DiSette?
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1 MR. DISETTE: I suppose. I'll make the motion to recommend to the Commission that we do not 2 3 accept the Robert Verno request. MR. CHISEM: Second. Carl Chisem. 4 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion? 5 Hearing none, all in favor, say aye or raise your 6 7 hand. (No audible response) 8 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It's unanimous. The ayes 9 have it. 10 11 All right, we're almost at the end. Cynthia Washburn. Mr. Newman? 12 MR. NEWMAN: Yes. This is Colin Newman 13 14 again. So Cynthia Washburn was initially employed 15 with Eastern Connecticut State University between August 2^{nd} of 1985 and August 14^{th} , 1987. It appears 16 that - well, she was in a position as a university 17 assistant, which was a position that was ineligible 18 19 for retirement purposes. However, it appears that she 20 may have had had a secondary employment, specifically between October of '86 and August 6th of 1992, which 21 indicated where she actually had plan membership in 22 23 Tier II. In 1995, Ms. Washburn was reemployed as a

parttime lecturer. And this is one of her claims is

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the fact that she was not provided the opportunity to complete a CO9-31 where she would be able to designate the plan that she — or where the plan designation would occur. The State payroll records reflect that she was not a member of any retirement plan during the time from 1995 to 1997. What I had listed for the Subcommittee were the actual semester dates between those two points in which Ms. Washburn was — had signed contracts for.

After she had separated on May 21st of 1997, she became reemployed into a fulltime position with Manchester Community College on August 14th, 1998, and she was placed in the SERS Tier IIA retirement plan.

Ms. Washburn has in April formally appealed her tier placement. Like I said, she is claiming that she was never afforded the opportunity to participate in a pension plan, and when she was rehired in 1998, she wasn't given any information on the differences between Tier II and Tier IIA.

She does state that in 2004, she had inquired with her HR office as to whether or not she would receive any vested retirement credit for that period of time between 1995 and 1997 because she had some concerns about reaching the ten years of service for qualification for tenure as well as retirement

purposes. Her inquiry was forwarded to the Retirement Division. The Division responded in December of 2004 advising that Ms. Washburn had chosen not to participate in service, and therefore she had no prior service as a member of SERS.

Ms. Washburn is contending that she was never advised about the tier placement determination - she was never advised that the tier placement determination could be appealed. And that sense, I think that's the reason why this claim is coming forward now, almost 18 years later.

She provided two affidavits from two members of the human resources office, who were in the office at the time of her hire in 1995. Those two individuals were responsible for her orientation at that time, and they provided supporting affidavits to her argument.

Now, the Commission in the past like adopted a policy because - but this goes back to like 1989, because they recognized at the time, there was evidence that parttime employees were treated inconsistently with respect to membership in SERS. So the policy at that time was that Tier II members whose history of parttime service could have resulted in placement in Tier I shall be afforded a onetime

opportunity to elect Tier I membership or remain in Tier II.

If that same policy was applied in Ms.

Washburn's case, she would still actually be placed in Tier IIA, and that's being consistent with the SERS plan provisions. When she was reemployed in 1998, in SEBAC 5, and that was in place at the time, in order for her to have been placed in Tier II, she would have had to have been either vested or eligible for either an immediate or deferred monthly benefit at the time of her separation date in 1995, or her periods of service as a Tier II member would have had to have been longer than her periods of non-membership, or five years, which is greater.

The periods of time that she was actually a member, the small separate periods of time that she actually had Tier II membership were less than - certainly less than five years, and less than the period of time that she actually separated from State service. And at the time when she left in May of 1997, a Tier II member, in order to be vested, had to have accrued at least ten years of vesting service. The five years of actual State service didn't come into play until from July 1, 1997 forward. Therefore, the Division maintains that Ms. Washburn is correctly

1 placed in the Tier IIA plan. 2 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, Colin. Okay. Cynthia Washburn. 3 This is Cynthia. Thank MS. WASHBURN: Hi. 4 you very much for hearing my case. And just for a 5 clarification, my appeal is involved in my hire from 6 7 '95 to '97, and I was not given the opportunity to fill out the CO9-31. I've provided a copy of my 8 paperwork, my file extensively from Eastern that I 9 provided here, and I'm not aware of any other 10 paperwork prior to '95 and '97. And so my feeling is 11 that not having been afforded an opportunity to fill 12 out the C09-31, I should have just defaulted to Tier 13 II, and then carried that forward. 14 15 I worked for a year and three months, and then my time after leaving in May of '97, I was hired 16 in August of '98. So it was - my time apart was less 17 than my time during that employment. And so that was 18 19 what I was basing my case upon. Yeah. 20 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you. 21 Okay. Any comments or questions? MS. WASHBURN: Could I ask one more question 22 23 by chance? CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yes. Go right ahead, 24 25 please.

MS. WASHBURN: It's my understanding that when you are employed, if you're eligible for retirement, you are to fill out a CO9-31 and the State agency has a copy and so does the Retirement Commission. And in any of my files, I've been told that I have no copies of a CO9-31.

Do you have a copy of a CO9-31 that I'm not aware of that, Mr. Newman, that you're referring to, or are we working off of no - and I know at a certain point in time, they were carbonless copies. And so it's not electronic as it is now. But is there a copy of a CO9-31 that I signed that I chose to not to participate in SERS?

MR. NEWMAN: So that's what you were claiming with respect to the letter that came from us in 2004. Because of the fact that we had stated that you did not indicate that you wanted membership in SERS, and now you're asking, do we have basically a CO9-31 supporting that. And the answer is no. It's just that apparently there is no CO9-31 that was signed during that period from '95 to '97.

MR. HERRINGTON: This is John Herrington.

Colin, can you kind of confirm the historical practice, right? So it's been stated as, oh, there's a rule that we need to have a 9-31 either

affirmatively electing membership or affirmatively waiving, and can you speak to what the historical practice was in the mid-90's?

MR. NEWMAN: Yeah. And so in the mid-90's, that wasn't necessarily the case because not everybody was completing - not everybody would complete a CO9-31, especially we were finding that a lot of the adjunctions. So back then, if a CO9-31 was received, where it indicated that the individual was requesting plan membership, you know, they would then be placed in the plan according to what was on the CO9-31.

And it was like that for a number or years because it really - and it was really because of those type of actions because it was - it wasn't - because of those type of actions is basically what led to that agreement in 2017 where, I mean, it was decided that someone's plan membership had to be determined on the first day of employment by having a CO9-31 completed.

It wasn't necessarily a mandatory action back in the '90's.

MS. WASHBURN: If I could comment just very quickly.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Please. Please proceed.

MS. WASHBURN: I worked in the State of Connecticut - State of Pennsylvania for five years

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from 1990 to '95, and I was fulltime and I was a part
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     of a pension plan for the State of Pennsylvania. I
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     left that State service to come to work at Eastern.
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     Had I known that I had an option to be put into a
     pension plan, I was aware of pensions and the value of
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     them even at the age of 34. Had I been given the
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     option to sign into one, I would have accepted it.
                I believe I put that in my letter as well.
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     And I just feel like I was given the option or the
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     knowledge to know that I even had that choice.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.
                MS. MESKERS: This is Patty Meskers. Just
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     to make one comment as to how the retirement was seen
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     back then, we looked at the payroll records. So it
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     wasn't necessarily CO9-31's. It was the agency
     payroll records. When the agency payroll reflects
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     number three, that means no retirement. So that's how
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     that was looked at, based on how the agency coded the
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     payroll.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT:
                                   Thank you.
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                Any further comments?
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                MS. CIESLAK: Chairman Adomeit, this is
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     Cindy Cieslak.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yes.
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                MS. CIESLAK: I will just note for the
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benefit of the trustees that the Commission's regulation does have a six-year limitation period to bring a claim to the Commission.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.

MR. COFFEY: If that's the case, then this case enters a whole new ballgame in terms of deciding whether the Commission wants to waive the statute of limitations. We have nothing to go on with respect to this particular case or why we would do it. It seems to me that we really have no alternative at this point but to deny, and if a challenge comes up with respect - or some issue comes up with respect to the statute of limitations, then we'll have to deal with it.

MS. WASHBURN: Could I comment again? It's-CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yes, please.

MS. WASHBURN: So I did ask in 2004. I didn't know I could appeal. I wasn't directed by my HR. I was on my own. I was not working at Eastern at the time, so I had no access to my Eastern personal (sic) file. I asked again in 2013 and I got a misunderstanding of my question, which is in that letter from the payroll person at - the HR person at that time.

 $\hbox{I've asked throughout my career a number of} \\$ $\hbox{different times because I felt that there seemed}$

something askew. And I asked again in '21. So it's not that I went 24 years without trying to investigate and figure out if my placement was appropriate. I feel like I, at the times of, you know, my ability to even figure out what to do, I felt like I pursued that.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.

MR. NEWMAN: This is Colin Newman again. I just want to state that, you know, what I said previously, even if giving Ms. Washburn the benefit of the doubt by including the periods of time that she was a parttime lecturer between '95 and '97, at the time with her last separation date in May, May 8th of 1997, she - and along with the other periods, the small periods of time that she appeared to have had some type of Tier II membership, she had about two years, about two years and a month of membership in Tier II, which, at the time when she separated, you need ten years to be vested. Hence the reason why when she came back in 1998, she was placed in Tier IIA.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you, Colin.

MS. CIESLAK: Mr. Chairman, this is Cindy

Cieslak.

CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Yes, go ahead, Cindy.

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MS. CIESLAK: As it relates to the
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     regulatory time period, so it's six years to bring a
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     claim (inaudible) or in equity, and then one year to
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     appeal from the Division's response, and the
     regulation permits the Retirement Commission in its
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     sole discretion to allow (inaudible) for extraordinary
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     circumstances. So I just wanted the Subcommittee to
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     have full information regarding the regulatory time
     period and what is permissible for a waiver-
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Thank you.
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                MS. CIESLAK: --at its discretion.
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     apologize for the baby.
                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All right. I'm looking
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     at the members of the Commission.
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                MR. COFFEY: Mr. Chairman, I move that we
     recommend to the Commission that it deny the request
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     of Ms. Washburn.
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                MR. DISETTE: John DiSette. I'll second.
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Any further discussion?
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     All in favor of the motion, signify by saying aye or
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     raise your hand.
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                (No audible response)
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                CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: It's unanimous.
                                                     Thank
     you, very much. Thank you very much, Ms. Washburn,
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     for coming. Appreciate it.
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                 That completes the agenda.
                MR. COFFEY: In that case, Mr. Chairman -
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     Bob Coffey - I move that we adjourn.
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                MR. CHISEM: Carl Chisem, second.
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                 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: All in favor, say aye.
5
                UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Aye.
6
                 CHAIRMAN ADOMEIT: Opposed, nay. The ayes
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8
     have it.
                (Adjourned at 4:16 p.m.)
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I, Karin A. Empson, do hereby certify that the preceding pages are an accurate transcription of the Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission, Subcommittee of Purchase of Service & Related Matters meeting held electronically via Zoom, conducted at 1:02 p.m. on October 4, 2022. Karin G. Empson Karin A. Empson 10/21/2022 Date